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 Social Justice for Children – A 
Capability Approach 
 In this chapter, we will outline a concept of social justice for children 
based on the capability approach. So far, this issue has received much 
less attention than it deserves given the particular social and political 
status of children in today`s world. The capability approach, as well as 
most other theories of justice, has not dealt with children thoroughly, 
although more and more literature on important questions in this regard 
is being published. We seek to answer two important questions that every 
concept of justice has to deal with: what is the right currency of justice, 
and what is its right principle? To phrase the questions slightly differ-
ently: what kinds of things are children entitled to as a matter of justice, 
and how should they be distributed? Our answer to the first question is 
that children are entitled to the achievement of important functionings; 
only as they develop is it adequate to provide them with capabilities. 
Hence, the capability approach to justice for children we want to defend 
is in large part a functioning approach. In regard to the second question, 
we defend a sufficientarian approach. In a nutshell, each and every child 
is entitled to reach a certain threshold in all these important function-
ings, and failing to do so constitutes an injustice. Since the main target 
of this book is child poverty in affluent societies and welfare states, we 
will model our concept of justice on children living within these soci-
eties, although we believe that many of our claims hold universally and 
could serve as the basis for a concept of global justice. In the end, we 
argue, justice for children is about safeguarding their well-being and 
well-becoming, and the functionings and capabilities that matter for 
justice, as well as the thresholds for them, should be selected with refer-
ence to that. Hence, well-being and well-becoming are the guiding prin-
ciples for our approach. 
OPEN
G. Schweiger et al., A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
© Gottfried Schweiger and Gunter Graf 2015
16 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
 1.1 The currency of justice 
 The first question a concept of justice for children has to answer is, what 
is the adequate currency of justice? That is, what types of things are chil-
dren entitled to as a matter of justice? The capability approach is first 
and foremost an answer to that question; it claims that the best avail-
able currency of justice is constituted by capabilities. In what follows, 
we will argue that the approach has something very valuable to offer to 
the  conception of justice for children but that it must shift its sole focus 
from capabilities, which essentially incorporate the notion of freedom 
of choice, to functionings that are actually realized. Justice for children 
has to be thought of as a dynamic concept that starts with functionings 
as the right currency; as children grow up, capabilities become ever more 
important. In the end, for adults, capabilities are what matter most, and 
the state or any other agent of justice should refrain from imposing 
functionings upon people who do not wish to have them. 
 Let us begin by spelling out some of its central concepts and assump-
tions. The origin of the capability approach lies in Sen’s criticism of utili-
tarianism and in his claim that human well-being cannot and should 
not be identified with subjective welfare or utility. There are several well-
known objections to the traditional formulation of utilitarianism, and 
replicating and assessing all of them here would exceed the scope of this 
book. Instead, we would like to point to some of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
concerns directly related to the metric of justice employed by utilitarians 
(Crocker 2008, 126–129). First, subjective welfare ‘does not adequately 
represent well-being’ (Sen 1990, 47). In its standard interpretation, it 
reduces the diversity of human experience to one single measure and 
suggests that, in the end, all different types of pleasures or satisfactions 
are commensurable. But does it really make sense to compare the pleasure 
we feel eating ice cream to that we get from helping a friend in need or 
raising a child? From Sen’s and Nussbaum’s point of view, it does not; they 
argue that the theoretical simplicity gained by adopting such a monist 
understanding of human well-being comes at a high cost: it cannot inte-
grate our commonsensical experiences of how we perceive our lives and 
the intuition that a variety of different aspects matter for our ‘wellness’. 
To be clear, subjective welfare is highly valued in the capability approach, 
and indeed, Sen refers to it as a ‘momentous functioning’ (Sen 1985, 
200). However, it should be seen as one aspect of a person’s well-being 
and not, as utilitarians suggest, the only thing that matters. 
 Second – and this is connected to the first point – the phenomenon 
of ‘adaptive preferences’ also suggests that a focus on a subjective metric 
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is misleading when conceptualizing the well-being of a person. To make 
his point, Sen refers to empirical evidence: human beings often adapt 
their assessment of their own situation, including their wishes, hopes 
and general psychological state, to the circumstances they find them-
selves in. On the one hand, this may have the effect that one can feel 
subjectively happy even when suffering considerable disadvantages:
 Our mental reactions to what we actually get and what we can sens-
ibly expect to get may frequently involve compromises with a harsh 
reality. The destitute thrown into beggary, the vulnerable landless 
labourer precariously surviving at the edge of subsistence, the over-
worked domestic servant working round the clock, the subdued and 
subjugated housewife reconciled to her role and her fate, all tend 
to come to terms with their respective predicaments. The depriva-
tions are suppressed and muffled in the scale of utilities (reflected 
by desire-fulfilment and happiness) by the necessity of endurance in 
uneventful survival. (Sen 1999a, 15) 
 On the other hand, some individuals might have ‘expensive tastes’, 
meaning that they feel satisfaction or subjective happiness only if they 
possess or consume costly goods, such as high-powered sports cars or Almas 
caviar. In such cases, unhappiness related to the nonavailability of such 
goods should hardly be taken as an indicator that their overall well-being 
is jeopardized. Again, these feelings are important to consider as an aspect 
but not as the only definitional feature of their well-being. Accordingly, 
the malleability of any mental metric counts against its adequacy. 
 Third, Sen argues that a focus on utility sees a person only as the ‘site’ 
in which pleasant or painful experiences take place; there is no further 
interest in any other information about her interests and objectives. 
Or as Sen and Williams once put it: ‘Persons do not count as individ-
uals in this [utilitarian approach] any more than individual petrol tanks 
do in the analysis of the national consumption of petroleum’ (Sen and 
Williams 1992, 4). In other words, the informational space employed by 
utilitarianism neglects a person’s agency; that is, her ability to act and 
bring about change in the world in line with her own values and goals 
(Sen 1999b, 19). According to Sen, being able to pursue a life she has 
reason to value is an immensely important feature of a person’s agency. 
Sometimes realization of values can imply hardship and may jeopardize 
many forms of human welfare and well-being. Nonetheless, he claims 
that a person’s freedom to follow her ideals must be considered in evalu-
ative exercises. 
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 The second position (or better, family of positions) Sen has exten-
sively criticized regarding its informational space can be labeled ‘resour-
cism’. Its central claim is that an individual’s social position can best be 
judged by her possession of some set of external resources. It comes in 
different versions, but the arguably most influential account is defended 
by John Rawls, whose work on justice has had a profound impact on the 
development of the capability approach. For Rawls, external resources 
relevant for the evaluation of social position embrace both material 
ones (such as money and wealth) and immaterial ones (e.g., rights and 
liberties). What really matters about them, according to Rawls, is that 
they are useful for pursuing a wide range of conceptions of the good 
life while being neutral about what this goodness consists of. In Rawls’s 
theory, it is up to the autonomous citizen to decide what kind of life she 
wants to lead. The state should provide only the means and the insti-
tutional settings needed for an ample variety of ways of life; it should 
have no right, however, to prescribe one doctrine (moral, religious or 
spiritual) that all its members have to follow. This skepticism stems from 
the conviction that even between completely reasonable and rational 
persons, there will be no full agreement about fundamental ethical and 
political matters. However, according to Rawls, a set of all-purpose means 
that are useful to all and therefore have to be distributed in a fair way can 
be agreed on. At the same time, they are useful for making interpersonal 
comparisons, since the same index of these resources (primary goods, in 
Rawls’s terminology) can be used to evaluate the social position of every 
citizen – they express each person’s level of advantage (Rawls 1982, 
163). Surely, Rawls’s theory of justice is complex, and his account of 
primary goods is but one of its aspects. Its critique should therefore not 
be taken as a critique of the whole theory, which has to include many 
more facets. Nevertheless, resourcism is arguably deeply entrenched in 
it and cannot be easily given up without a complete modification of his 
concept of justice (Nussbaum 2006). 
 Against resourcism – be it Rawls’s or any other version – Sen has 
brought forward inter alia the following two worries: First, Sen argues 
that the possession of resources is a misleading indicator for the social 
position of an individual; a variety of factors influence a person’s ability 
to use a bundle of resources for her objectives. In the societies we know, 
it is not generally the case, as a matter of empirical fact, that two indi-
viduals who possess the same (primary) goods are equally advantaged. 
Personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social 
climate, differences in relational perspectives and distributional issues 
within the family influence a person’s abilities to convert resources into 
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valuable outcomes (Sen 1999b, 71–72). A person in a wheelchair, for 
example, has to invest considerable resources just to achieve a degree 
of mobility someone without the disability enjoys with no investment 
whatsoever. As a realistic notion of advantage, resources are therefore 
problematic and in fact lead to unfair judgments. At closer examin-
ation, their alleged neutrality fails, allowing for discrimination against 
the less fortunate, who are generally in a less favorable position to use 
their resources for the ends they value. Second, and entangled with the 
first objection, Sen argues that a focus on resources ‘suffers from [a] 
fetishist handicap in being concerned with goods [ ... ] rather than with 
what these good things  do to human beings’ (Sen 1980, 218). Resourcist 
theories are right, according to Sen, to stress human agency, and indeed, 
resources are often a good approximation of the freedoms one enjoys. 
However, they are only the  means to achieve these freedoms and do 
not adequately represent a person’s actual opportunities to achieve well-
being or to find value in life, which are, according to Sen, the  ends we 
should seek and therefore include in societal evaluations. There are also 
other forms of resourcism, and some of them broaden the notion of 
what counts as a resource considerably, bringing them, in fact, closer to 
the metric of justice of the capability approach, which we will argue for 
in the course of this chapter. Take, for example, Ronald Dworkin’s influ-
ential position, which is typically discussed under the heading “equality 
of resources”, where he advocates that individuals should, over their life 
span, have access to an equal share of resources These resources consist 
of two types, personal and impersonal ones:
 [A person’s] personal resources are his physical and mental health 
and ability – his general fitness and capacities, including his wealth-
talent, that is, his innate capacity to produce goods or services that 
others will pay to have. His impersonal resources are those resources 
that can be reassigned from one person to another – his wealth and 
the other property he commands, and the opportunities provided to 
him, under the reigning legal system, to use that property. (Dworkin 
2000, 322–323) 
 In Dworkin’s theory, therefore both external goods (income and wealth) 
and the internal features of a person (such as talent and ambition) 
are seen as resources relevant for justice. However, personal resources 
are to a large extent subject to the natural lottery, and their unequal 
distribution usually cannot be redistributed easily or without ethically 
problematic measures. But people can be compensated for their low 
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share of personal resources with impersonal ones. The fairest way to do 
so, according to Dworkin, is determined by a hypothetical insurance 
market where people can be insured against being untalented, handi-
capped and the like. Here is not the place to discuss Dworkin’s theory in 
detail, but there are two interrelated issues we would like to note. The 
first one is that Dworkin’s resourcist metric of justice has to be distin-
guished from a capability-based theory, and the second is that his idea 
of equality of resources is connected to assumptions that are plausible 
in the context of ideal theory but lead to problematic consequences in 
nonideal circumstances (Pierik and Robeyns 2007). This book needs a 
theory that works within nonideal contexts, and this is a strong reason 
to reject the sophisticated form of resourcism put forward by Dworkin. 
We now treat these two issues in turn. 
 Taking up and extending a critique of Dworkin’s theory first brought 
forward by Andrew Williams (Williams 2002), Roland Pierik and Ingrid 
Robeyns introduce the following example to show that there is a diffe-
rence between equality of resources and equality of capability, which 
Dworkin explicitly denied; they argue that capabilities, in fact, can not 
be subsumed under his theory of resources (Pierik and Robeyns 2007; 
Dworkin 2000, 299–303; Dworkin 2002). Amy and Ben are twins and 
happen to have exactly the same personal and impersonal resources; 
both want to found a family with a member of the opposite sex. We 
do not know how they would like to divide care work and market work 
between them, but there are basically three categories of persons in this 
regard: homemakers (who are primarily in charge of domestic work and 
child rearing), ideal workers (who work to generate income and neglect 
domestic work) and coparents (who share different kinds of work roughly 
equally). We also know that half of the men in society prefer sharing 
coparent duties and that the other half prefer being ideal workers. With 
women, the distribution of preferences is as follows: Half are indifferent 
to being an ideal worker or a coparent, 40 percent want to be either a 
coparent or a home worker, and 10 percent prefer to be ideal workers. 
According to this distribution of preferences, Ben has a very high chance 
of becoming a coparent (90 percent) and a reasonable opportunity to 
be either a home worker (60 percent) or an ideal worker in his relation-
ship. For Amy, the situation looks different. She has a 50 percent chance 
of becoming both a coparent and a home worker. But the option to 
become an ideal worker in her family is nonexistent because there are 
no men willing to do the domestic work on their own. Now, given that 
the preferences of the members of this society are authentic and not 
influenced by prejudice (two important conditions for a just background 
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structure), Dworkin’s theory leads to the conclusion that there are no 
morally relevant inequalities between the situations of Amy and Ben 
since they possess exactly the same resources. The actual distribution 
of (authentic) preferences and tastes is a matter of luck and should not 
be seen as triggering claims of justice (Dworkin 2000, 69–70). As will 
become clear in the following, a capability perspective would judge this 
example differently. There is a difference between the real freedoms of 
Amy and Ben. Their resources are the same, but what they can do with 
them is different. This aspect matters from the perspective of justice, 
expecially in nonideal circumstances, bringing us to the second reason 
why we reject Dworkin’s resourcist approach for the purposes of our 
book. Dworkin’s theory can best be classified as an ideal theory of justice 
that works with strong assumptions and idealizations. His principles of 
justice are derived from a thought experiment assuming that the people 
involved choose against a background of equality of opportunity and 
nondiscrimination the rules that should govern the institutional struc-
ture of their society. He abstracts from inequalities and power structures 
as they exist in virtually all societies and does not consider histories of 
subordination, be it in relation to gender, race or wealth, and simply 
assumes that the preferences of all people involved in his thought 
experiment are authentic. It is therefore not clear what the implica-
tions of his theory are for real-world contexts. He seems to assume that 
legal measures and economic redistribution (Dworkin 2000, 175) can 
effectively fight injustice, ignoring the widely established relevance of 
sociocultural inequalities, which are of the uttermost importance for 
studying, understanding and alleviating poverty. Here, a direct focus on 
how people effectively live their lives and the real freedoms they enjoy 
seems to provide a more feasible way than a focus on resources – even 
if understood in Dworkin’s broad way. Looking again at the example 
of Amy and Ben, the difference in the opportunities they have within 
a social context because of sex should be alarming; downplaying the 
issues of justice involved by pointing to the fact that they have an equal 
share of resources just seems too easy an excuse. 
 With this we do not claim that Dworkin’s approach cannot, in prin-
ciple, be fruitfully used as a normative background theory for criticizing 
poverty. However, it seems to us that much more theoretical work needs 
to be done to apply it in this domain and that the capability approach 
provides more accessible tools to deal with injustices as they factually 
happen. It is true in part that it lacks the clarity of Dworkin’s (also 
Rawls’s) theory of justice, a clarity gained by idealization and abstrac-
tion. However, clarity is not very useful if it is too far from the social 
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world’s realities. Here, so we argue, the capability approach works much 
better. 
 Let us look at Sen’s alternative account to well-being and advantage, 
which solves, or so he argues, the issues criticized on the other proposals. 
In doing so, he introduces the concepts of functionings and capabil-
ities, which focus directly on an individual’s life and which enable 
the conceptualization of her opportunities (e.g., Sen 1992, 39–42; Sen 
1999b, 74–76; see also Alkire 2002, 4–11). Functionings are the activities 
and states that make up a person’s life; they are the different ‘beings’ 
and ‘doings’ living consists in. And since human existence encompasses 
many different doings and beings, the category of functionings is a 
broad one and includes being healthy and educated, having a shelter 
and taking part in the life of the community, as well as being under-
nourished, killing animals and feeling emotional distress. In any case, 
it is essential to note two things: First, they have to be distinguished 
clearly from the resources employed to achieve these functionings, 
even if most of them depend heavily on some of their input. Second, 
the criticized mental metrics as used by utilitarians can be seen as a 
relevant subcategory of functionings (e.g., being happy), but they do 
not – by far – include all the necessary information about an individ-
ual’s circumstances. For Sen, however, it is not enough to look only at 
the functionings realized by a person in order to compare his situation 
with that of others. As already indicated, he considers the freedom to 
lead a life one has reason to value as one of the most valuable features 
of human life. In order to express this idea, he introduces the notion of 
capabilities. They are defined as the functionings a person has actually 
access to and reflect the person’s freedom to realize different achieve-
ments. To give an example: eating is a functioning, while the real oppor-
tunity to eat is its respective capability. Normally, it is important to look 
at capabilities not one by one but in combination with each other – 
usually, the realization of one specific functioning influences others, 
and only a holistic approach can retrieve all the relevant information. 
Notice that Sen in fact originally introduced the concept of a capability 
to refer to  a set of combinations of functionings , each representing a feas-
ible lifestyle (Sen 1980; Sen 1992). However, in his other writings, he 
uses the term ‘capability’, as introduced here, to refer to the freedom 
to achieve one particular functioning, a usage that is nowadays wide-
spread in the literature. Take, for example, someone who has to make a 
choice between a job that gives him an income necessary for a decent 
living but that is so time-consuming that his personal relationships will 
be reduced drastically. It is this interconnectedness between different 
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valuable achievements that must be considered for evaluating a person’s 
situation comprehensively. If not, it might get overlooked that a good 
choice with respect to one domain was – all things considered – a tough 
or even tragic one. Since capabilities are a kind of freedom, it also 
becomes clear that the approach gives a high value to people’s agency, 
which is, according to Sen, understood as the faculty to act and bring 
about change according to one’s values and objectives (Sen 1999b, 19). 
In the end, people should be able to identify with their choices and 
actively shape their own lives; it is therefore decisive for a just society to 
provide the conditions to make this, in fact, possible. 
 It is crucial to understand that the notion of well-being as it is used 
in the capability approach must not be identified with what is typically 
termed ‘welfare’ in political philosophy or economics, where the term 
is understood exclusively in relation to individual preferences or happi-
ness. As shown, this position was powerfully rejected by Sen. Or to put it 
differently, the notions of well-being, on the one hand, and functionings 
and capabilities, on the other, are closely related, and there is by now a 
vast literature confirming this diagnosis (Comim, Qizilbash and Alkire 
2008; Deneulin and Shahani 2009; Biggeri, Ballet and Comim 2011). 
Welfare, on the other hand, in Sen’s terminology, is only one aspect of 
the overall well-being of a person and must not be reduced to it. 
 A person’s capabilities (but also achieved functionings) depend on 
many different factors. They are a product of a person’s abilities and 
skills, as well as the political, social and economic context she finds 
herself in. They obviously usually depend on resources; without the 
necessary goods, it is simply not possible to live a self-determined life 
according to one’s own conception of the good. However, what matters 
is the ‘relationship between persons and goods’ (Sen 1980, 216) and 
what the relationship allows us to do and be. 
 In this context, the term “conversion factors” is helpful. It was intro-
duced by Sen to conceptualize the relation between resources and the 
realization of certain functionings, and it calls attention to the degree a 
person in fact can use the goods at her disposal for her purposes. At least 
three different kinds of such factors can be identified, all of which have to 
be taken into account when evaluating the real freedoms somebody has 
access to (Sen 1992, 19–21; Sen 1999b, 70–72; Robeyns 2005, 98–100). 
First, there are personal conversion factors. Our physical, psychological 
and emotional characteristics, as well as our achieved levels of skills, 
influence what we can ‘get’ out of the resources we command. If we 
are in good health, for example, we do not need a lot to achieve basic 
mobility. However, due to illnesses or impairments, moving around can 
24 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
be burdensome and only possible with the right assistance or technical 
tools (e.g., by using crutches or a wheelchair). We can observe that, in 
some cases, lower levels of well-being or freedom resulting from personal 
heterogeneities can be compensated by more or special kinds of resources. 
Sometimes, however, even the best support or the greatest wealth does 
not outweigh the respective disadvantages (Nussbaum 2006). Personal 
conversion factors highlight the many differences existing between 
people and their relevance for using the goods they possess for their 
ends. They can add much interesting information to evaluative exercises 
and detect inequalities relevant for ethical theories, but they also point 
out that during a person’s life course, the characteristics decisive for her 
realization of valuable functionings vary greatly. 
 Second, there are environmental conversion factors relating, for 
example, to varieties of climates and geographical locations but also to 
pollution and the prevalence of diseases. All these aspects have a direct 
impact on the individual, her freedoms and level of well-being and 
must be considered in the conceptualization of a person’s capabilities. 
Pure survival in a country with low temperatures depends on adequate 
clothing and shelter with heating facilities and the respective invest-
ments that are not necessary to make in milder regions of the world. Or, 
to give another example, the high levels of smog and problems in the 
water supply as experienced by some of the world’s megacities directly 
bear on the quality of life of their inhabitants. These environmental 
circumstances restrict good human functioning in many ways, and even 
considerable wealth cannot outweigh them. The life of each person must 
therefore be examined in a variety of environmental dimensions to get a 
realistic picture of what can be achieved with a fixed set of goods. 
 Third, social conversion factors play a role in how an individual can 
benefit from resources or a certain amount of income. This category 
embraces public policies, power relations and social norms, for example, 
and emphasizes that every individual is embedded in a social context 
that is crucial for understanding her real freedoms. Educational and 
health programs run by the state might allow access to important func-
tionings without demanding material wealth, and the absence of crime 
or violence contributes massively to the quality of life in the locations 
in question. If the streets are not safe, options of what can be done with 
one’s possessions get restricted. A nice car is of no use if it is too dangerous 
to drive it on the streets. Discriminating practices, gender roles and soci-
etal hierarchies, too, must be taken into account when analyzing the 
relationship between persons and goods. If there are rules excluding girls 
from the educational system in a certain society, even having the best 
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schools next door is not helpful for the capability to be educated; if a 
social norm forbids women to cycle, possessing a bike in combination 
with cycling skill does not lead – as is usually the case – to the result that 
a woman will consider cycling a real option; her actual possibility to use 
the respective good gets restricted by her social environment. 
 Summarizing, conversion factors point to the complex relationship 
between what a person has and what kind of life she in fact enjoys, 
and accordingly, we need to know many aspects of a person’s situation 
in order to judge how well off she is. Resources, social institutions and 
norms, as well as the environmental context, all play an important role, 
and an analysis focusing on functionings and capabilities must take all 
of them into account while acknowledging that they matter primarily 
as means and not for their own sake. Two important points follow from 
these considerations: First, the capability approach entails a position 
called ‘ethical individualism’, which claims that the individual is the 
fundamental moral category. In the end, the quality of a society is judged 
by how well it manages to show respect and concern for each and every 
one of its members, taken one by one. As Nussbaum once put it:
 [ ... ] the capabilities sought are sought for  each and every person , not, 
in the first instance, for groups or families or states or other corporate 
bodies. Such bodies may be extremely important in promoting 
human capabilities, and in this way they may deservedly gain our 
support: but it is because of what they do for people that they are so 
worthy, and the ultimate political goal is always the promotion of the 
capabilities of  each person . (Nussbaum 2000, 74) 
 Second, however, it must not be overlooked that this focus on the indi-
vidual does not ignore the social nature of human life. On the contrary, 
what the discussion about conversion factors showed is that the 
capability approach stresses the social embedding of every person and 
that only against this background can her individuality come forward 
and her life be assessed adequately. This also means that the capability 
approach naturally goes hand in hand with a critique of social relations 
which hinder the social conditions of freedom for every citizen (Graf 
and Schweiger 2014). The evaluation of capabilities, therefore, has to 
recognize the many ways oppression and exploitation are present in a 
society and how these phenomena affect relations of equality between 
people (Anderson 1999). 
 We have outlined some of the criticisms capability scholars have 
brought forward against other informational spaces, and we have 
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introduced the notions of functionings and capabilities and put them 
into the wider context of the concerns of the capability approach. From 
our point of view, they provide the best approach to a metric of indi-
vidual advantage, and they should also therefore be used to make inter-
personal comparisons that matter from a social justice perspective. They 
shift the focus from a mere provision of goods to the question of what 
these goods allow persons to be, do or achieve, recognizing variations 
in a person’s ability to convert goods into valuable functionings. This 
characteristic, together with the explicit recognition of the multidimen-
sional nature of a person’s well-being and the central place attributed to 
human freedom, makes this metric of justice suggested by Sen preferable 
to other options, such as primary goods or utilities. Furthermore, they 
allow for a direct connection to the social scientific literature, where 
functionings and capabilities are used in issues of measurement and 
conceptualization. Does this conclusion also hold for children, with 
whom this book is concerned? Or do we need to adapt the capability 
approach somewhat? In what follows, we will discuss why the adequate 
currency of justice for children does not straightforwardly consist of 
capabilities, as is typically the case for adults. 
 Children are different in many important aspects, the two main ones 
being that children are not autonomous beings from the beginning but 
become autonomous over the course of childhood and that they are 
developing beings who change rapidly and whose development can be 
severely hurt by outside influences. Both imply that children are more 
vulnerable to certain forms of harm and that they are heavily dependent 
on others as well. We distinguish three kinds of vulnerability: phys-
ical, mental and social; the last can be further differentiated into legal, 
economic and political forms. These forms correlate with dimensions 
of powerlessness. It is evident that a child’s body suffers more severely 
than an adult’s from physical violence, such as shaking, and that certain 
hazards that are only a small problem for an adult can be a deadly threat 
for a newborn or toddler. It is also a fact that the physical and mental 
development of children can be severely distorted by external factors 
like toxic chemicals in the environment and that such influences on 
development can be irreversible (Landrigan and Goldman 2011). Various 
psychological research studies on the development of the self and 
personality and on socialization have examined the effects of outside 
surroundings on children. For instance, it has been shown that girls who 
suffer from maltreatment during childhood may develop a low percep-
tion of their own social power in relationship with others; this state 
may be predictive of a propensity for abusiveness in their relationships 
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with their own children (Bugental and Grusex 2007). Another example 
includes the associations found between early attachment security and 
measures of emotional health, self-esteem, agency and self-confidence, 
positive affect, ego resiliency and social competence in interactions 
with peers, teachers, camp counselors, romantic partners and others 
(Thompson 2007). It is crucial always to be aware of the fact that there 
is only one chance for each child to develop and grow up, and distor-
tions in early life cannot be taken back. Still, research like this should 
not be interpreted to mean that children are passive objects in their own 
development and that childhood predicts everything. Rather, it should 
help us understand that all humans are dependent and are shaped by 
interactions with others and the environment – interactions that greatly 
influence who we are and what we are able to be and do. 
 The social vulnerability of children partly stems from their limited 
capacities and their needs and partly from how childhood is framed in 
modern societies (Graf 2015). They are economically vulnerable because 
they cannot take care of themselves in the same sense as adults. Most 
importantly, they cannot (up to a certain age) work and are not allowed 
(again, up to a certain age) to work and be economic agents, and they 
have essentially no control over their income and other resources like 
housing and transportation. If their parents become unemployed, for 
example, children cannot substitute that lack of income or otherwise 
sufficiently support their parents to cope with this situation. They are, 
in fact, often victims of these situations and the high level of stress that 
they cause (Edwards, Gomes and Major 2013). Furthermore, they are 
legally subject to their parents and their decisions in many ways. If a 
child is neglected, it is often not in the child’s power to claim proper 
treatment by her parents, and it can be very difficult for her to reach 
out and demand others to help and intervene (also because family rela-
tions are fueled by emotions). In many welfare states, parents have a 
wide range of rights to control and shape the lives of their children; 
in some of them even corporal punishment and with it many possible 
severe consequences for the child’s development are allowed and toler-
ated (Durrant and Ensom 2012). 
 Children are politically vulnerable because they cannot effectively 
change their political position and they depend on the rights they are 
granted by others (Milne 2013). Children cannot fight for their rights in 
the way adults can, and they cannot organize themselves in a compar-
able manner that would gather them political influence. Their social 
vulnerability is hence also produced and sustained by their social power-
lessness. Children have less power and fewer capacities and opportunities 
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to alter their lives, and many opportunities they have are not good ones. 
The rare opportunities to acquire resources and funds to make a better 
living, for example, through work and labor, are limited, and there are 
very good reasons to ban children from working and laboring, not to 
speak of such illegal and evidently harmful ways as begging and stealing. 
In certain cases, it is better for children to leave their families and homes 
and live on their own (if they are old enough) or in other forms of care 
arrangements, but in general it is widely acknowledged that this is not 
good for either their well-being or well-becoming (Lawrence, Carlson 
and Egeland 2006). 
 The vulnerability and powerlessness of children reflect, thus, two 
dimensions of the specific moral and political status children can 
and should have due to the nature of their being. On the one hand, 
as we have argued so far, powerlessness increases and creates certain 
 vulnerabilities in children; it is also socially created to an extent. On the 
other hand, to hold children powerless in some areas is not only permis-
sible but an entitlement of justice and morality that children should be 
granted. It is important to note the crucial difference between children 
and women and other powerless subjugated social groups in large parts 
of this world. Being held powerless certainly does not protect women; 
they are oppressed, and justifications applied to children, like inferior 
competence and vulnerability, do not apply to women or minority 
groups (Nussbaum 2000). 
 Most theorists concerned with justice for children acknowledge that 
these vulnerabilities, together with their potential to develop into 
autonomous beings, constitute a particular ‘nature’ of children that 
grants them a different moral and political status (Archard and Macleod 
2002; Brennan and Noggle 2007). It is also at this point, where the 
capability approach has been criticized for not being suitable as a norma-
tive theory for children. As Colin Macleod argues, the notion of capabil-
ities is closely tied to an ‘agency assumption’, one that presupposes that 
the subject in question is able to make autonomous decisions. And since 
children – especially younger ones – miss this feature, the capability 
approach has problems to integrate them into his conceptual framework 
(Macleod 2010). We will argue later on that this problem is solvable and 
that the concepts of evolving capabilities and achieved functionings are 
of great value here. But before we do this, let us explore more deeply 
the question of autonomy and development, how children are ‘special’ 
and that it is very important to distinguish between different groups of 
them: Children are a very heterogeneous group, more so than a group of 
adults, when it comes to significant differences. A ‘normal’ two-year-old 
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toddler’s skills and capacities differ more from a ‘normal’ twelve-year-old 
teenager’s than those of a ‘normal’ twenty-five-year-old differ from a 
‘normal’ fifty-five-year-old’s. Exceptions, such as people with severe 
disabilities, do no refute this assumption, because they are seen as just 
that: exceptions. Nor does this rest on a strong anthropological concep-
tion about what is human; it can be expressed only via a very shallow 
understanding of empirical facts about humans. A good comparison is 
provided by the concept and definition of health and disease: the fact 
that some people are born with severe cognitive disabilities does not 
lead to the conclusion that suffering from a head trauma that shows 
the same outcome is something ‘normal’ in the sense that it should not 
be seen as impairment to health. Humans can differ greatly in many 
aspects, but it is plausible to assume that children are particular in some 
of those and that these aspects change as children develop. A capability 
approach to children has to recognize these differences and changes and 
see them as morally relevant, a view supported by Nussbaum and Dixon 
in the context of children’s rights:
 The idea of agency has a central role to play in the CA: the capability 
approach sees people as striving agents, and in contrast to approaches 
that aim only at the satisfaction of preferences, it aims at supporting 
the growth of agency and practical reason. This emphasis on agency, 
under a CA, further means that children should be afforded the 
maximum scope for decisional, freedom consistent with their actual – 
or potential – capacity for rational and reasoned forms of choice, or 
judgment. For adolescents in particular, this may mean recognizing 
a range of rights to sexual and reproductive choice, religious choice, 
and choices regarding custody. In many cases, it will also mean 
granting at least certain decisional rights to younger children. (Dixon 
and Nussbaum 2012, 559–560; footnotes omitted) 
 Childhood is a phase of rapid changes in all known mental, physical 
and social categories. So, when we write here about children, we should 
always be aware that the category of children is very vague and encom-
passes humans with great differences in skills, capacities and needs, 
which implies that a claim justified toward a toddler can be unjustified 
toward an adolescent. In fact, treating an adolescent like a toddler is 
denigrating and humiliating and certainly does not accord with treating 
her justly (Brighouse 2003). 
 What we can say, though, is that children lack the skills and capacities 
needed to make fully autonomous choices and decisions for themselves 
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until they are grown up and are hence to be seen as adults. This does not 
mean that they cannot articulate their wishes and preferences or that they 
cannot decide anything for themselves from a certain age on, but a theory 
of justice for children cannot and should not assume that the subjects of 
this justice are fully autonomous beings. The same is probably true for 
many adults, but in a different sense, which does not hold as a general 
rule rooted in their ‘natural’ capacities. Many adults are restricted in their 
freedom because of external factors, but children are so because of what 
they are and what they can do and be, based on their still developing minds 
and bodies. This becomes obvious if one looks at very young children: A 
toddler cannot make any reasonable decision for herself and is dependent 
on adults to the extent that her life is in danger if she is abandoned. The 
lack of autonomy of children is surely based not only in human biology 
but also in the social arrangements constructed around childhood. The 
legal position of children, for example, restricts them in their autonomy 
even though it is unclear in the cases of some older children and adoles-
cents whether they are really less capable of making their own choices 
than many adults, who are not equally restricted by the law. Such arrange-
ments are in need of a close examination as to whether they really fit chil-
dren, respect them and do justice to them, but in general, it is reasonable 
to claim not only that children are less autonomous but that there are 
good reasons to let them make only limited choices for themselves. 
 This refers both to their lack in competencies and to their nature as 
developing beings. All humans change throughout their entire life, but 
childhood is a phase of rapid and significant change like no other, and 
this development is highly influential for the whole future life course. 
Development does not simply happen to children; it must be fostered, 
and children’s development is influenced by their environment and 
the people and institutions interacting with them. Children’s devel-
opment can be severely hurt and damaged, with sometimes lifelong 
consequences. We will soon introduce the concept of corrosive disad-
vantages, which is a suitable description of such damages with lifelong 
consequences. Children do not know what is best for their develop-
ment, as well: A baby cannot know whether a vaccination helps prevent 
severe diseases, and she cannot know that the pain of getting a shot is 
outweighed by the lifelong protection from severe illness. Older chil-
dren cannot know what learning is good for, even if they often enjoy 
learning, and that going to school is a crucial condition for their future 
well-being and for what they can do later on in their lives. 
 As a consequence, we wish to endorse the view that childhood should 
be a protective phase and that children have a right to have a childhood 
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separated from the adult world in some features. Not having to make 
certain decisions and not being held responsible for one’s actions to the 
full account also provide protection, and children would be overbur-
dened if they were granted the full range of rights and duties as adults. 
Children lack the competencies and autonomy to make many decisions 
for themselves and to know what is best for them, their actual well-
being and their future well-being. Such a justification of partial pater-
nalism toward children, which decreases as they grow up and become 
more mature, is widely acknowledged, although there is significant 
disagreement about the justificatory bases of paternalism and how far 
it should go; for example, in regard to teenagers and adolescents who 
show (nearly) the same competences as most adults (Archard 2004; 
Franklin-Hall 2013; Anderson and Claassen 2012). 
 What such a developmental view of children, together with an 
acknowledgment of their agency, means for capability approach theory 
has already been fleshed out in some detail (Ballet, Biggeri and Comim 
2011). In particular, the concept of evolving capabilities was introduced 
as a crucial conceptual extension to the prevalent terminology. Evolving 
capabilities include the dynamic aspect of the development of capabil-
ities and explicitly link the person’s abilities, achievements and circum-
stances at different points in time:
 The process of capability expansion or of evolving capabilities starts 
from an initial set of achieved functionings of the child at time tn. 
The process of resource conversion is very much affected by how 
different institutions, norms and cultures constrain or empower 
them, shaping the formation of a new set of functionings and 
capabilities that are inter-temporally distinct. The child’s capability 
set (opportunity freedom, i.e. the vector of potential valuable and 
achievable functionings) is thus given by the resources/constraints, 
by his or her limited opportunities and by his or her own abilities. 
From the multidimensional capability set the choice will determine 
the vector of new achieved functionings at time t  n +1 . The dynamic 
process is going to be influenced by feedback loops if seen as taking 
place in sequential periods of time. [ ... ] The emotional and cognitive 
development of children goes through different stages in which their 
decision making and agency is shaped by their life experiences and 
mimicking behaviour. (Ballet, Biggeri and Comim 2011, 34) 
 The concept of evolving capabilities thus grasps the fact that capabilities 
change over time according to different factors. The already introduced 
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notion of conversion factors is helpful to further clarify this point. If 
we look at internal factors, we realize that a child’s opportunities typic-
ally broaden in childhood due to physical, psychological and emotional 
changes. Furthermore, children acquire skills that can be used to get 
more out of the commodities they have access to. This expansion of 
their capabilities is certainly related to biological facts about the way 
humans grow up, but it would be wrong to reduce human development 
to such a perspective – this is where social conversion factors come into 
play. On the one hand, they often relate directly to what is ‘internal’ to 
a person. The social context profoundly influences our psychological, 
emotional and even physical development, the skills we are able to learn 
and the aspirations we have. This shows that internal conversion factors, 
too, do not merely exist in a vacuum but must be interpreted over a 
certain social context. One can also mention here the close relationship 
between a child’s capabilities and those of her parents or close caregivers 
(Ballet, Biggeri and Comim 2011, 30–31). As is well known from empir-
ical research, disadvantages are often transferred from one generation 
to the next, and without improving the capabilities of a child’s attach-
ment figures, it is unlikely that her life chances will be comparable to 
those of her peers from a privileged background as understood in terms 
of the caregiver’s capabilities (which do not equal their material wealth). 
On the other hand, social norms and institutions regulate our lives in 
many ways and our ability to use resources for our aims. The case of chil-
dren in modern Western societies serves to illustrate this point: Often 
enough, their possibilities are constrained; for example, by the fact that 
they have to attend school, kindergarten or other educational facil-
ities that entail a set of rules and restrictions that are, at least in some 
aspects, different from the regulations adults face. Furthermore, there are 
usually laws and social expectations in place, treating children and adults 
differently and granting them different degrees of authority over their 
own circumstances. As we have argued, such an approach is valid if it is 
applied sincerely and with care. But the point is that all these facets – and 
many more – have to be taken into account when analyzing the evolving 
capabilities of children and the effective freedoms they enjoy. 
 Analyzing the well-being and well-becoming of children in terms of 
evolving capabilities brings another aspect to the surface, which relates 
to the many interconnections between different functionings and 
capabilities, their synergies but also negative interactions. This point is 
worth emphasizing for several reasons and will provide a main point of 
reference for our argument about the injustice of child poverty, which 
we will develop in the next chapter. 
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 First, it is likely that certain functionings and capabilities are valu-
able not only in themselves but also because their possession posi-
tively influences other functionings and capabilities. As we will argue 
in more detail in the next section, a clear case can be made that health, 
for example, fulfills such a function and that it therefore makes sense 
to have a special look at health, also in the case of social analyses and 
distributions of inequalities. This idea of particularly important dimen-
sions of the life of a human being, which ‘spread their good effects 
over several categories either directly or by reducing risk to the other 
functionings’, was introduced by Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit 
in their book  Disadvantage , connecting it explicitly with the capability 
approach. They term this category ‘fertile functionings’ (Wolff and 
de-Shalit 2007, 121) and suggest that their identification and promo-
tion among the least advantaged members of society will lead to social 
change and a reduction of disadvantage. They are also very clear that 
social policy has to make sure that people in fact realize these func-
tionings and that they not be defined as capabilities where freedom of 
choice plays a major role (Wolff and de-Shalit 2013). While this point 
has been controversially discussed for adults, for children the case is 
clearer; for them, the category of achieved functionings needs to have 
priority, especially when they can be proven to be fertile. However, since 
for children the differentiation between well-being and well-becoming 
is particularly important, the notion of ‘fertile functionings’ has to be 
understood from both perspectives, as well. On the one hand, they are 
important because they promote other dimensions of well-being. On 
the other hand, their positive effects might spread to a child’s future 
and well-becoming. Certainly, both aspects are relevant and have to be 
included in the concept of fertile functionings. Which functionings play 
such a role is the subject of empirical studies, and a normative theory 
cannot develop its claims without considering such knowledge; it has to 
work with the best available evidence and must also acknowledge vari-
ations in different contexts. What is fertile in one case does not neces-
sarily have this effect in another one, even if it is reasonable to assume 
that some functionings, health, for example, are likely to have a fertile 
effect almost universally. 
 Second, and very closely connected to the notion of fertile func-
tionings, are ‘corrosive disadvantages’, which are also introduced and 
analyzed by Wolff and de-Shalit (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 121). Here 
the idea is that some disadvantages have negative impacts on many 
other aspects of life, leading to a variety of drawbacks. Again, such disad-
vantages might be relevant for the well-being of a child; for instance, 
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when lack of decent living conditions directly translates into social 
problems. They also serve, however, as an important category for future-
oriented analysis. Corrosive disadvantages have a middle- and long-
term impact on a child’s life, and their negative effects often become 
clear only when they are put into a life-course perspective. It is of great 
moral importance that children enter their lives as adults in a condi-
tion where enough significant life chances are still available for them. 
Consequently, moral harm is done not only insofar as children experi-
ence suffering and neglect in childhood but also when the way they 
live their childhoods reduces valuable options they find as adults. Take, 
for example, the case of physical abuse, experienced by many children. 
Its immediate damage is, of course, severe and its impact on the child’s 
well-being disastrous. However, the full picture of its moral harm can be 
evaluated only if we take into account its impact on the child’s future 
life, in relation, for instance, to health problems, social status, economic 
well-being and a range of psychiatric disorders (Lanius, Vermetten and 
Pain 2010; Widom et al. 2012; Currie and Widom 2010), all of which 
reduce a person’s well-being, including the faculty of self-government 
and the effective pursuit of a life plan. In our argument about the 
injustice of child poverty, which we will develop in detail in the next 
chapter, it will therefore also be crucial to look at aspects of children’s 
lives that have particularly positive or negative effects in the long run. 
Naturally, such an endeavor is connected to empirical knowledge, and 
indeed we will argue that philosophical theories about justice have to 
work closely with empirical analyses that add substance to purely theor-
etical considerations. As in the case of fertile functionings, finding out 
which disadvantages are indeed corrosive is not a purely philosophical 
matter. On the contrary, identifying and clarifying the causal relations 
between disadvantages is mainly an empirical task. The same is true for 
studying and understanding how patterns of disadvantage arise, why 
they persist and which factors contribute to the fact that they can even 
be transferred from one generation to another. 
 Fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages are related in many 
ways. However, it is important to separate them on a conceptual level and 
to stress that there is more to the distinction than acknowledging that 
one and the same functioning can have good or bad effects, depending 
on its realization or absence (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 134). To illustrate 
this point, it suffices to note that, in many situations of disadvantage, it 
is not enough to eliminate the causes of the problem, including disad-
vantages considered corrosive. In many cases, something additional is 
needed to effectively overcome the difficult situation. Take, for instance, 
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the case of someone who has an alcohol addiction. It is easy to imagine 
that this problem is a corrosive disadvantage, leading to many negative 
consequences; ending the addiction alone is not a guarantee that many 
of the experienced disadvantages disappear. It might be necessary for 
the person to develop a new sense of self-worth and self-efficacy – fertile 
functionings, which are not directly related to the experienced disad-
vantages – to succeed in life. On the other hand, the absence of many 
fertile functionings does not always lead to disadvantages. A sense of 
humor, to take Wolff and de-Shalit’s example, is certainly of help in 
many ways to deal with difficult situations. But its absence probably has 
relatively few other negative effects and should not, in typical circum-
stances, be counted as corrosive. 
 Third, a look at the concept of evolving capabilities and the inter-
relation of different functionings and capabilities in their formation 
stresses the importance of  functionings . As described by Ballet, Biggeri 
and Comim, the process of capability expansion always starts by an 
initial set of archived functionings and has to take into account which 
functionings will be realized during the development process, as well. 
Wolff and de-Shalit also deliberately write about fertile  functionings (and 
not capabilities), characterizing corrosive disadvantages first and fore-
most in relation to achieved functionings. In their theory, they do not 
use the concept of evolving capabilities, and their focus is not mainly 
on children, but this observation is relevant nonetheless. The reason 
for this is that the ability to choose for oneself and to determine one’s 
life is dependent on many preconditions, and a certain level of overall 
well-being typically has to be achieved so that choice in a meaningful 
sense can be exercised. In the terminology of the capability approach, 
this means that the category of functionings must not get neglected and 
that they provide valuable insights in the distribution of disadvantages 
in a society. We would like to emphasize that, in the case of children, it 
would be generally wrong to give them only the capabilities to achieve 
certain levels in different dimensions of well-being. What matters is that 
they actually lead good lives and not merely that they have the options 
to do so if they want to. In regard to children, Nussbaum prefers such a 
perspective as well: 
 If we aim to produce adults who have all the capabilities on the 
list, this will frequently mean requiring certain types of functioning 
in children, since, as I have argued, exercising a function in child-
hood is frequently necessary to produce a mature adult capability. 
Thus it seems perfectly legitimate to require primary and secondary 
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education, given the role this plays in all the later choices of an adult 
life. Similarly, it seems legitimate to insist on the health, emotional 
well-being, bodily integrity, and dignity of children in a way that 
does not take their choices into account; some of this insisting will 
be done by parents, but the state has a legitimate role in preventing 
abuse and neglect. Again: functioning in childhood is necessary for 
capability in adulthood. The state’s interest in adult capabilities gives 
it a very strong interest in any treatment of children that has a long-
term impact on these capabilities [ ... ]. (Nussbaum 2000, 89–90) 
 For children, however, functioning may be made the goal in many 
areas. Thus I have defended compulsory education, compulsory health 
care, and other aspects of compulsory functioning. (For example, I 
support an age of consent for sexual intercourse, so that children’s 
bodily integrity is protected whether they like it or not.) Compulsory 
functioning is justified both by the child’s cognitive immaturity and 
by the importance of such functioning in enabling adult capabilities. 
(Nussbaum 2006, 172) 
 Where does that leave us in the question of the right currency of justice 
for children? The restriction of children’s autonomy is, as we see, not 
only a reaction to their limited competencies and skills but also justi-
fied by the need to protect them, their development and their future 
life chances (Noggle 2002; Archard 2003). It is hence a part of justice for 
children, and giving children too much autonomy over their lives too 
early would expose them to great risks. It is very likely that these chil-
dren, once they have grown up, would make serious accusations and 
blame their parents and the state for having let them down by allowing 
them to quit school at the age of seven, by not getting healthy food 
because they preferred junk-food or by not going to the dentist and 
subsequently having serious health issues. Children cannot use capabil-
ities in the way adults can, and they do not gain the same amount of 
value from having a choice when they are very young. A toddler does 
not have an increase in real freedom and does not see the value in being 
presented with many potentially valuable options – her needs are more 
focused. The risk of overburdening children by letting them decide is also 
to be considered. We see good arguments that claim that functionings, 
instead of capabilities, are to be preferred, but over the course of child-
hood and as children develop into more and more autonomous beings, 
capabilities become more important and finally take over. The develop-
mental perspective of Nussbaum is only one important aspect, and the 
issue of autonomy and being protected as a child matter equally. We 
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claim that functionings are the right currency of justice for children not 
solely because this will lead to the development of adults with certain 
capabilities but also because functionings represent what children need 
in order to have a good childhood, since they cannot make all decisions 
for themselves. One of the main reasons for preferring capabilities over 
resources is that people are given real freedoms, but for children real 
freedoms matter less, at least until a certain point in their development. 
This is not to say that freedoms do not matter at all for children, but 
they have to be interpreted in a suitable way, taking account of the fact 
that full autonomy is not the right category for thinking about chil-
dren’s choices. However, so far, we have described these concepts only 
as formal categories without specifying their exact content. In order to 
apply the capability to the problem of justice, something more must be 
said about this issue, and one needs to take a stand regarding (a) which 
functionings and capabilitities matter for social justice and (b) to what 
degree or threshold must they be secured in order to achieve social 
justice. In the next sections, we will address these questions in turn. 
 1.2 Selecting functionings and capabilities for children 
 The next task to further develop our concept of justice for children is to 
select functionings – for older children, capabilities – that are relevant 
for assessments of justice. Sen has never identified a comprehensive list 
of functionings and capabilities, either for adults or for children, that 
could be used as the basis for a theory of justice. On the contrary, he 
has brought forward some reasons why he is skeptical about such an 
endeavor (Sen 1993; Sen 2004b). He argues that a predefined list of what 
is valuable to human life ignores what people actually value and might 
be overly paternalistic. Furthermore, it goes against the ideal of public 
deliberation processes that Sen sees as the best and the legitimate way 
to answer value questions. Finally, he suggests that moral questions are 
notoriously difficult to answer and that this insight, too, speaks against 
the definition of a full list. Throughout his works, he frequently refers 
to some examples of capabilities he believes to be supported by a wide 
range of moral and political positions, which he terms ‘basic capabil-
ities’. However, his remarks on this subject remain only exemplary, and 
all in all, he refrains from substantial claims when it comes to value 
questions on an abstract and universal level detached from concrete 
contexts and socioeconomic circumstances. His version of the capability 
approach is therefore best understood as an ‘analytical device’ that can 
be used for different ends. In particular, Sen reminds us that evaluative 
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exercises have to incorporate a variety of diverse concerns and dimen-
sions. In doing so, he also explicitly stresses the many (causal) relation-
ships between different functionings and capabilities and emphasizes 
how important empirical work is for the subject matter of political phil-
osophy. From his point of view, the capability framework serves to clarify 
what is at stake in public reasoning, helping to make social evaluations 
open and transparent. However, it cannot, a priori, solve moral disa-
greements (Sen 2005, 157). Nonetheless, Sen is confident that there will 
always be enough intersections between different reasoned approaches, 
providing guidelines for actions that lead to the enhancement of justice 
(Sen 2009). 
 While Sen sees this ‘undertheorization’ of the capability approach 
as a specific strength, others have raised doubts about it. Most import-
antly, it has been argued that without some specifications of objectively 
valuable functionings and capabilities, the capability approach does not 
have any normative force, especially if one wants to apply the notion 
of social justice in a global and multicultural context (Nussbaum 2003; 
Arneson 2006; Nussbaum 2011, 69–75). In this line of thought, different 
lists have been proposed and discussed by philosophers and researchers 
who work empirically, but none of these lists seems to satisfy all critics. 
We agree that it will not be possible to have one list for all purposes 
and that it is important to specify the items according to certain goals 
and contexts. In addition, there will always be discussions about the 
adequacy of fully specified lists, if they include everything that is valu-
able or if they miss important information. However, a critique of child 
poverty needs to take up a position at least on some of the crucial elem-
ents for children’s lives; only then will it be possible to inform and guide 
a society on the design of its institutions and on its policy decisions 
broadly construed. But fulfilling this task does not rely on an exhaustive 
and fully specified list of capabilities, be they deduced from philosoph-
ical argument or from the outcome of ideal deliberation processes. Much 
can be achieved with pragmatic and preliminary lists, and our treatment 
of the injustice of child poverty in the next chapter will be a good occa-
sion to prove this point. But before we present the list we see as suitable 
for our purposes, let us briefly review two influential suggestions as to 
what such a list might look like in the case of adults. 
 The most prominent list is certainly Nussbaum’s, which distinguishes 
ten central human capabilities. She argues that her list is grounded on 
the idea of a life worthy of human dignity, which in turn draws on 
the intuition that every person is a needy and social creature capable 
of reasoning. The central human capabilities are defended as universal 
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and prepolitical entitlements, which every state has to guarantee for its 
citizens. According to Nussbaum, her list appeals to very fundamental 
values shared by many different moral and religious doctrines (although 
for different reasons), and it can be, over time, the object of an over-
lapping consensus in the Rawlsian sense. She is also very clear that in 
providing these capabilities to citizens, she does not mean to push them 
into a set of specific functionings. The choice to realize a specific life 
remains with each and every individual. Before presenting the list, it 
must also be noted that her understanding of capabilities is broader 
than Sen’s. While Sen defines them as real opportunities, for Nussbaum 
they also include talents, internal powers and abilities. Sen’s conversion 
factors are therefore already integrated in her concept of capability itself 
(Robeyns 2003, 75). In our view, this is more of a conceptual issue than 
one of substance, but it explains to some extent the ways they charac-
terize and write about this concept – and these conceptual ambiguities 
have certainly provoked some misunderstandings in the literature. The 
list reads as follows (Nussbaum 2011, 33–34):
 (1) Life . Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; 
not dying prematurely or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not 
worth living. 
 (2) Bodily Health . Being able to have good health, including repro-
ductive health, adequate nourishment and adequate shelter. 
 (3) Bodily Integrity . Being able to move freely from place to place; to be 
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic 
violence; to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice 
in matters of reproduction. 
 (4) Senses, Imagination and Thought . Being able to use the senses, to 
imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly 
human’ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate educa-
tion, including but by no means limited to literacy and basic math-
ematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and 
thought in connection with experiencing and producing works 
and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical and so 
forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees 
of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic 
speech and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleas-
urable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain. 
 (5) Emotions . Being able to have attachments to things and people 
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve 
at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, 
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gratitude and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional devel-
opment blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability 
means supporting forms of human association that can be shown 
to be crucial in their development.) 
 (6) Practical Reason . Being able to form a conception of the good and 
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. 
(This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious 
observance.) 
 (7) Affiliation . 
 A.  Being able to live with and for others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of 
social interaction, to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting 
this capability means protecting institutions that constitute 
and nourish such forms of affiliation and also protecting the 
freedom of assembly and political speech.) 
 B.  Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being 
able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to 
that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on 
the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, reli-
gion, national origin. 
 (8) Other Species . Being able to live with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants and the world of nature. 
 (9) Play . Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
 (10) Control over One’s Environment . 
 A.  Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices 
that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation 
and the protections of free speech and association. 
 B.  Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable 
goods) and having property rights on an equal basis with 
others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis 
with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and 
seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exer-
cising practical reason and entering into meaningful relation-
ships of mutual recognition with other workers. 
 Another example of a concrete list of valuable capabilities is the one 
offered by Ingrid Robeyns (Robeyns 2003), who distinguished fourteen 
dimensions for evaluating gender inequality. Her list is based on a meth-
odology that involves four criteria: First, the selection process and the 
selected functionings or capabilities must be explicitly formulated so 
that they can be openly discussed, criticized, defended and, if needed, 
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modified. Second, there is a criterion of methodological justification. 
The method used to generate the list must be clarified and scrutinized. 
Furthermore, it must be defended as to why it is appropriate for the issue 
at hand. Third, lists can be formulated at different levels of generalities, 
and an individual has to decide, according to the aims she pursues, at 
what level she works – reaching from ideal theory to pragmatic lists 
constrained by the given circumstances. Fourth, norms of exhaustion 
and nonreduction should be met: The capabilities on the list should 
include all elements that are important and should not be reducible to 
other elements. Her list is as follows:
 Life and physical health: being able to be physically healthy and (1) 
enjoy a life of normal length. 
 Mental well-being: being able to be mentally healthy. (2) 
 Bodily integrity and safety: being able to be protected from violence (3) 
of any sort. 
 Social relations: being able to be part of social networks and to give (4) 
and receive social support. 
 Political empowerment: being able to participate in and have a fair (5) 
share of influence on political decision-making. 
 Education and knowledge: being able to be educated and to use (6) 
and produce knowledge. 
 Domestic work and nonmarket care: being able to raise children (7) 
and to take care of others. 
 Paid work and other projects: being able to work in the labor market (8) 
or to undertake projects, including artistic ones. 
 Shelter and environment: being able to be sheltered and to live in (9) 
a safe and pleasant environment. 
 Mobility: being able to be mobile. (10) 
 Leisure activities: being able to engage in leisure activities. (11) 
 Time autonomy: being able to exercise autonomy in allocating (12) 
one’s time. 
 Respect: being able to be respected and treated with dignity. (13) 
 Religion: being able to choose to live or not to live according to a (14) 
religion. 
 As one can see, there are several similarities between Robeyns’s and 
Nussbaum’s lists, but that is not the point of interest for us. We are 
concerned with justice for children, and what is apparent is that neither 
Nussbaum’s nor Robeyn’s list is suited for them in every aspect. Let us 
discuss a few of the problematic cases: Nussbaum included the ability 
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to move freely on her list, something that is, for good reasons, limited 
for children. It would be highly problematic if that capability would 
be granted to children at all ages, as it would put them at high risk. 
The same is true for the capability of practical reason and that children 
should be able to plan their own lives. This is certainly not possible in 
the same way as it is and should be for adults. Likewise, political partici-
pation, having the right to seek employment and to hold property are 
highly problematic for children, especially younger ones; these are not 
proper capabilities for them. If we think in terms of functionings instead 
of capabilities, which is more adequate for young children, these items 
on the list become even more problematic. Other capabilities are suit-
able for children, like health and education, but they should be inter-
preted in terms of functionings rather than capabilities, and they have 
to be adapted in regard to the actual development stage of the child. 
Basic competencies and knowledge in literacy, math and science are a 
good thing for a child of school age, but for the first months of life, chil-
dren need to achieve other functionings first and have certainly other 
needs. The same inadequacies can be found in regard to Robeyn’s list, 
but that is no wonder, since she drafted it not as a universal list but one 
with a particular topic in mind: namely, gender injustices; more specif-
ically for adults, not young boys and girls. Being able to work in the 
labor market is for many children more a threat than a unit of justice; 
being able to raise children is a very problematic issue for teenagers, and 
there are many good reasons to assume that reproductive health during 
adolescence also includes family planning and being protected from 
unwanted pregnancy. What we would like to make clear is simply that a 
list for children has to look different than a list for adults, even though 
there are some very important overlaps. We now want to present and 
discuss six criteria for selecting functionings and capabilities that matter 
for children for the issue of social justice:
 A functioning or capability that is used for an analysis of injustice (1) 
has to reflect a truly important dimension of a child’s well-being or 
well-becoming; in this sense, it has to be child-specific. Justice for 
children is concerned with things that really matter for them and 
not with supplements or ‘extras’. As we have seen, the category of 
functionings is at first a formal one, and in theory, one could make 
it a question of justice if a child is able to whistle or stand on her 
head. This would, however, be a distortion of the concept of justice, 
which should look at functionings that make a substantial difference 
to a child’s well-being and well-becoming. The genuine importance 
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of a functioning for the well-becoming is best defined in relation to 
its contribution to the achievement of one or more other important 
capabilities as an adult. In our view, most approaches used to generate 
the lists found in literature (including the ones by Nussbaum and 
Robeyns) already incorporate in one way or another such ‘signifi-
cance criteria’, and the dimensions they identify are typically truly 
important for a good human life; notwithstanding, they do not 
address the particularities arising when looking at children, and as a 
consequence and quite naturally, they do not tell anything specific 
about the well-being and well-becoming of children. In addition, 
we would like to emphasize that we see the notions of well-being 
and well-becoming as basic ones for normative reasoning. Hence, 
we deliberately depart here from Nussbaum, who suggests that her 
list can be justified based on the notion of human dignity and a 
life worthy of it. There are three reasons for this decision.  Firstly, 
there is a certain ambiguity inherent to the notion of dignity: it is 
something all humans have and not something one can reach or 
fall short of. It is therefore nothing that can be a goal of justice in 
itself. Dignity can indeed be violated, and living conditions may be 
indecent, but the people whose dignity is violated and who have 
to live in such ways still have their dignity. By using the concepts 
of well-being and well-becoming, on the other hand, we want to 
highlight from the beginning that we are dealing with something 
aspired to, a goal that should be reached but that a lot of children 
are denied. Each and every child is born with equal dignity, but not 
all have the same chance to achieve well-being and well-becoming. 
Secondly, we understand dignity as a minimum concept, one that 
does not entail the full scope of justice. Justice encompasses a living 
in dignity but demands more. This is especially important if justice 
is applied in modern affluent societies and welfare states that have 
already reached a high level of development and welfare. It seems 
plausible that two children can both be treated with dignity but 
have a fairly unequal level of well-being and well-becoming, which 
should be criticized as unjust. Thirdly, well-being and well-becoming 
are developmental and dynamic concepts, while dignity is a more 
static concept. It is also obvious that well-being and well-becoming 
demand different things for children and adults, while it is less clear 
how to spell out the same using the notion of dignity. Justice for 
children is necessarily concerned with these issues of development 
and with the task to weigh the current and the future well-being of 
a child against each other. 
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 Still it should be made very clear that human dignity is an important 
part of children’s lives, of their well-being and well-becoming. Looking 
at what some researchers, including Nussbaum herself, have deduced 
from the concept of human dignity, many similarities can be observed, 
and it seems possible to interpret dignity and well-being in a way that 
they are more or less the same. Yet our shift to well-being and well-
becoming is a signal that what matters for children is more than dignity, 
dignity being undoubtedly an important part. 
 The selection of a functioning that matters for justice should be (2) 
based on the best available (empirical) evidence. Research on the 
well-being and well-becoming of children is a multidisciplinary task 
involving a variety of perspectives, methodologies and research para-
digms (Graf and Schweiger 2015). Specifying functionings for the 
purpose of social justice must necessarily involve a close dialogue 
with developments in the relevant fields and the knowledge of the 
physical, mental and social needs of children. This point entails that 
lists of functionings have to be adapted, modified and redefined if 
new evidence is available; indeed, results of the last decades show 
that the new knowledge coming up makes a substantial difference 
(Ben-Arieh 2010; McAuley and Rose 2010). In this regard, the list we 
will suggest does well, since it was generated with expert knowledge 
and specialists of different fields; nonetheless, it is clear that the 
list must be constantly scrutinized and connected to results gained 
by the scientific community. One final remark should be made in 
this context: While it is important to select functionings on the 
best evidence available, one should not expect a scientific method 
that will lead to a clear and uncontroversial result. In fact, the 
multidisciplinary approach we suggest is likely to lead to ongoing 
controversies about fundamental issues of children’s well-being and 
well-becoming, which have to be confronted continuously and with 
the necessary intellectual honesty. 
 Selecting functionings for the purpose of characterizing children’s (3) 
well-being and well-becoming in relation to social justice has to 
take into account if their (re)distribution is possible and feasible. 
In particular, their distribution must be influenceable by the insti-
tutional design of a society. In fact, this claim has to be at the heart 
of any approach that looks at distributions of well-being and well-
becoming from a social justice perspective. Here, some difficult 
questions arise that are closely connected to a general critique of 
the capability approach as it was stated by some resourcists and that 
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we will mention later on in this chapter in our assessment of the 
sufficiency principle as defended within the capability approach. 
Some resourcists argue that functionings and capabilities are not the 
right metric for justice exactly because it is unclear what distributing 
them means and because it is not obvious that the basic structure of 
a society can have an influence on them. Functionings and capabil-
ities, so the argument goes, might be a good metric for conceptu-
alizing human well-being, but claims of  justice have to rely on a 
different metric, and some sets of resources do, in their point of 
view, a better job in this regard (see Kelleher 2013). We agree that 
a theory of justice that operates within a functioning or capability 
metric has to face these distributional concerns and that there might 
be cases where a functioning is important for the well-being of a 
child but is not the subject of a justice-based claim. For instance, if 
a child has a serious accident and subsequently suffers permanent 
damage, for example, in cognitive and motor domains, it is likely 
that she will never be able to enjoy some of the functionings that 
other children can still reach without a problem. This fact is not, 
however, per se a problem of justice. Sometimes there are limits to 
what can be achieved, and there are limits to which kinds of support 
one is entitled to; we will address this point in the context of how a 
sufficiency principle should be interpreted so that both the demand 
side and the supply side are taken into account. Impairments and 
disabilities must be surely included in reasoning about justice as well, 
and it is certainly the duty of a just society to enable persons with 
disabilities the access to a broad range of functionings and capabil-
ities as far as possible (Nussbaum 2006). In many cases, however, 
there are limitations to what is feasible – there are ‘tragic fates’ that 
have to be recognized by a theory of justice. But these distinctions 
and refinements should not lead us astray from the fact that many 
important functionings and capabilities are capable of being influ-
enced by the way a society arranges its institutions. Social scientific 
evidence increasingly suggests that many aspects of human life are 
fundamentally shaped by the environment and social relations, as 
well as by the distribution of goods and rights. Hence, how a society 
is organized and how it regulates its institutions have an immediate 
impact on the functionings and capabilities of its members, and 
therefore many of them fulfill these criteria. Philosophy, too, has 
to work closely with other scientific disciplines, since this empirical 
work transcends its scope; the clear tendency is that certain aspects, 
such as health – which John Rawls, for example, still considered a 
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natural primary good and hence not subject to social distribution – 
are now seen by many political philosophers as highly influenceable 
by social factors. Health justice is a blooming research field, and we 
agree that the evidence that great injustices are happening in this 
regard is overwhelming. These few considerations illustrate that a 
variety of functionings and capabilities are socially influenceable. 
Certainly, they are not distributable, as are money and other material 
goods, and in individual cases people will not be able to achieve 
them even with good institutions in place. However, a society can 
still provide the general framework for a just distribution, and it can 
do its best in order that its institutional design secures, at least to a 
very high degree, that every child can actually enjoy the function-
ings in question. 
 The concept of justice demands that the functionings taken as the (4) 
basis for the respective evaluations are, at least to some extent, 
objectively determinable and not merely subjective. They should 
not depend primarily on the assessments, experiences and evalua-
tions of the subjects in question. In other words, what is important 
is not mainly that someone feels or thinks that she suffers from 
an injustice but that there are good external and intersubjectively 
comprehensible reasons that an injustice is happening. This set of 
criteria is relevant both for children and adults and connects to 
the arguments capability scholars usually bring forward to criti-
cize subjective metrics of justice as defended, for example, by util-
itarians. The subject’s preferences are malleable and adapt to the 
circumstances it is used to, introducing distortions in its percep-
tion and evaluation of the situation. Claims of justice must there-
fore be aware of this danger and take these ‘adaptive preferences’ 
seriously. In the case of children, this aspect is of particular rele-
vance and must not get neglected. For such reasons, happiness is 
not a good guide for justice for children, and it seems more suitable 
to take mental health as an indicator (Cabezas, Graf and Schweiger 
2014). Furthermore, objectively determinable functionings allow 
comparing the well-being of children in a meaningful way, and they 
make changes and improvements traceable and perceivable by other 
members of society. Such information is indispensable for a concept 
of justice that can guide the design of institutions and policies. It 
needs ‘hard’ and accessible criteria for the evaluation of personal 
advantage. If not, measures for (re)distributing functionings and 
capabilities cannot be justified toward others, and it is unlikely that 
they are supported by the public. Objective measurability also limits 
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the possibility of cheating, which, again, has a positive effect on 
public acceptance of a just regime. 
 The selection of functionings has to include children’s own views. A (5) 
concept of children’s well-being and well-becoming cannot ignore 
what aspects are relevant to children themselves, how they perceive 
their lives and where they set their priorities. Respecting children and 
their agency is tantamount to choosing such an approach, and there 
is overwhelming evidence that children are capable of expressing 
their point of view if they are given appropriate opportunities to do 
so. Different settings and methodologies can be used, adapting them 
to specific age groups and cultural contexts (Lansdown and UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre 2001; Camfield, Woodhead and Streuli 
2009; Percy-Smith and Thomas 2010). As a consequence, subjective 
experiences and the children’s point of view are of great importance 
in the selection process of relevant functionings, although we want 
to stress that their consultative function has to be a priority. This 
point might seem to be in opposition to the one before, where the 
objective accessibility was emphasized. However, this is not the case 
because the selection process has to be separated from its outcome. 
Of course, subjective assessments are relevant for the process, but 
the fact remains that the functionings resulting from it have to be 
measurable – at least to a considerable part – objectively if they have 
a role to play in a concept of justice. Furthermore, taking seriously 
the child’s point of view has a dimension that goes beyond the 
useful information if often generates. The respect a society owes its 
children entails that they have to be granted a ‘right to be heard’. 
As we have argued above, it is generally not reasonable to give chil-
dren full authority over their own circumstances. But they certainly 
have their own views from an early age on, and giving them the 
opportunity to express them is of value independently of any instru-
mental considerations (Archard and Skivenes 2009). 
 Finally, the fertility or corrosiveness of a functioning – in the sense (6) 
introduced earlier on – should be taken into account. According to 
their positive or negative effects on the development and achieve-
ment of other functionings and capabilities, different weights can 
be given to different functionings in the context of justice theory. 
Especially for children, these concepts have to be considered a 
priority because childhood is the phase of every human being’s life 
where the foundation for well-being and well-becoming is laid and 
where the fertile or corrosive effect of a functioning (or its absence) 
has long-lasting consequences. 
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 Finally, we will discuss a list that so far presents one of the best avail-
able approaches to children’s well-being from a capability perspective. 
Mario Biggeri and his colleagues (Biggeri 2003; Biggeri and Mehrotra 
2011; Biggeri and Libanora 2011; Biggeri and Santi 2012) proposed a 
pragmatic and empirically informed approach to selecting functionings 
and capabilities for children that are important to their well-being and 
well-becoming. They worked with two types of procedures, which we 
explain in what follows. 
 Biggeri and his colleagues took up Robeyn’s suggestion and carried out 
a procedure to conceptualize a child-sensitive list of capabilities in the 
following way: In a first phase, a group of child experts (including UNICEF 
officers, psychologists, sociologists and NGO practitioners) selected, on 
the basis of their knowledge and experience, relevant capabilities for the 
evaluation of child well-being. Since the well-being of children is a concern 
for many stakeholders and different scientific disciplines, such an inter-
disciplinary and interprofessional approach seems to be required. There 
is a need to include theoretical and empirical as well as ethical reasoning 
to comprehensively grasp the different dimensions at stake, something 
that can be achieved only through a dialogue involving a broad range of 
experts. In the second phase, the reasons for the choices were explained 
and the inclusion of each capability was justified, relating them to other 
works on the capability approach, particularly those of Nussbaum and 
Robeyns, and to literature on children’s issues as published by the UN 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the United Nations (UN). Again, methodological concerns suggest 
this proceeding, taking into account the most important documents 
already developed in the field of the well-being of children, relating them 
conceptually to the capability approach and seeking valuable links and 
mutual improvements. In the third phase, an appropriate level of abstrac-
tion of the different items was chosen in order to make them generally 
applicable to children as a group while still including the uniqueness of 
each child. Finally, the list was rechecked both to include all relevant 
dimensions for analyzing the well-being of children and for nonreduc-
tion, meaning that none of the domains should be reducible to another. 
As a result, the following list emerged (Biggeri and Mehrotra 2011, 51): 1 
 Life and physical health: being able to be born, be physically healthy (1) 
and enjoy a life of normal length 
 1  The items marked with * have to be interpreted in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child. 
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 Love and care: being able to love and be loved by those who care (2) 
and being able to be protected* 
 Mental well-being: being able to be mentally healthy (3) 
 Bodily integrity and safety: being able to be protected from violence (4) 
of any sort 
 Social relations: being able to be part of social networks and to give (5) 
and receive social support* 
 Participation: being able to participate in and have a fair share of (6) 
influence and being able to receive objective information* 
 Education: being able to be educated (7) 
 Freedom from economic and noneconomic exploitation: being able (8) 
to be protected from economic and noneconomic exploitation* 
 Shelter and environment: being able to be sheltered and to live in (9) 
a healthy, safe and pleasant environment 
 Leisure activities: being able to engage in leisure activities (10) 
 Respect: being able to be respected and treated with dignity (11) 
 Religion and identity: being able to choose to live according to a (12) 
religion and identity or to choose not to do so* 
 Time autonomy: being able to exercise autonomy in allocating (13) 
one’s time* 
 Mobility: being able to move (14) 
 We agree that this list in fact represents central aspects of the well-being 
of children on a general and abstract level. It represents many of the 
core elements also found in other approaches to this topic and brings 
together different fields of discourse. It also fulfills the six criteria we 
have proposed. All of these functionings and capabilities (according to 
the child’s maturity and competence) are based on research, are object-
ively determinable (at least to some extent) and are highly influenced 
by social arrangements, and many of them are fertile. We believe this 
list is best understood as a pragmatic and empirically informed selection 
of the functionings and capabilities that matter for the well-being and 
well-becoming of children; it is based on broad consensus backed up by a 
wide range of experts from different fields (academic and nonacademic), 
giving the selection a high grade of credibility that extends beyond 
purely philosophical arguments. If it is in fact exhaustive, as Biggeri and 
his colleagues suggest, the question is certainly a disputed, not easily 
answered one. However, it does not seem to be necessary to have a clear 
and final stance on this issue in order to provide a theory of justice for 
children that is able to give a fundament for the evaluation of a society’s 
practices and institutions and to guide its development for the better. 
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We therefore also disagree with Robeyns’s fourth criterion (exhaustion 
and nonreduction), since it is too demanding and not necessary for all 
purposes and applications. 
 The identified functionings and capabilities are formulated at an 
abstract level and must subsequently be specified according to the rele-
vant cultural and social contexts. Thus, they include both context-sen-
sitive and context-transcending features alike: In order to give concrete 
meaning to them, they have to be related to existing norms and prac-
tices, taking a great deal of diversity into account. A child’s social rela-
tions and friendships, for instance, cannot be conceived the same way 
in a rural region in western Africa, in a favela in Rio de Janeiro and in a 
wealthy region in London or Paris. There is, however, a universal core 
to them that reflects central features of how children can flourish, not 
leading to a complete relativism on what social relations of children 
should look like. Isolation or interactions based on physical or psycho-
logical violence or categorical subordination, for example, are wrong 
independent of context. Similar considerations are true for all the other 
dimensions, which always have to be interpreted in accordance with 
local beliefs and circumstances without losing sight of their defining 
features. 
 The composition of the list recognizes that functionings and capabil-
ities usually develop over time, giving the well-becoming aspect an 
important role. In fact, many of the items have to be interpreted taking 
the age and maturity of the child into account in order to understand 
their concrete meanings, an insight that is intuitively plausible and a 
cornerstone of current thinking about childhood and children’s partici-
pation. This also means that it is crucial to give children age-appropriate 
opportunities to exercise choices and to make use of freedoms, even 
if they should not be as ample as those of adults and controlled in a 
way that they do not jeopardize important functionings. Children are 
social agents from an early age on, and it is important for them to make 
their own decisions. Hence, freedom is also a central category for chil-
dren, but it should be of course exercised in an adequate environment, 
conducive to the development of more and more rational and reason-
able decision making, leading to a steady improvement in a person’s 
global autonomy. Looking at children in this way and characterizing 
them as subjects of evolving capabilities (and not just as ‘sites’ where 
functionings get realized) fits well with a new ethical attitude toward 
children that sees them no longer exclusively as recipients of services 
or passive beneficiaries of adults’ care or care of state institutions but 
as the subjects of rights and active participants in their development 
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and in the life of the community (Lansdown and UNICEF Innocenti 
Research Centre 2001). Such an approach to children’s development 
also makes clear that the concepts of functionings and capabilities, 
which are often clearly separated on a conceptual level, are in practice 
deeply entangled. Certain functionings have to be secured so that real 
choices can be made, and the situation of children illustrates this point 
further: as evolving agents, they rely on certain levels of health, educa-
tion and social inclusion in exercising their choices – not only in terms 
of accessible opportunities but of actually realized functionings. Thus, 
for many social evaluations, it is reasonable to make functionings the 
most important category of analysis, especially when children are the 
target group. In the next chapter, we will also show that a focus on 
choice and freedom is often not the best way to scrutinize and evaluate 
the injustice of child poverty. Without downplaying their competencies, 
skills and agency, in many contexts it is basic to look at what has been 
effectively achieved and not at the options that are available to them. It 
matters, for instance, that children are in fact well nourished, not that 
they are capable of being so. 
 A few provisos are necessary: Firstly, we do not claim that this list 
is finished. It is open for discussion and further scrutiny, and other 
researchers using different methods or working on questions in a 
different context will produce slightly different lists. Secondly, the simi-
larities to the lists of Nussbaum and Robeyns suggest, as we have stated 
before, that some functionings and capabilities are important for both 
children and adults. Thirdly, this list is still very vague and needs to be 
further specified in order to be able to be applied in different contexts. 
Nonetheless, it is a start, and we will use this list, more specifically 
some of the functionings and capabilities on it, to further examine 
the injustice of child poverty in the next chapter in more detail. We 
position ourselves therefore with a rather pragmatic approach within 
the mentioned discussions about adequate lists for theorizing justice. 
We do not aim for completeness; nevertheless, we are confident that 
on this basis we will be able to build a strong case that child poverty 
profoundly violates what social justice demands. Before we can do that, 
however, we have to discuss the issue of the rule or principle of justice 
we want to endorse. 
 1.3 Sufficiency and equality 
 In the last section, we have argued that functionings (and, if applicable, 
capabilities) should be seen as the best currency of justice for children. 
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In addition, we have proposed some criteria for selecting functionings 
and capabilities for children and presented a list that can give guidance 
for our purposes in this book. We have also discussed that justice should 
put priority on fertile functionings, which enable the development and 
achievement of other functionings and capabilities, and that the detec-
tion and alleviation of deprivations that constitute corrosive disadvan-
tages should be prioritized. In this section we address the question of 
the rules and principles of justice and, hence, how these functionings 
and capabilities should be distributed among the children in a society 
and how much of these they are entitled to; that is to say, the question 
of putting a threshold on each functioning and capability below which 
a child is deemed to live in injustice. There is a long-running dispute 
between scholars about the right rule of justice, and the main options 
disputed are equality and sufficiency (or priority) or a mixture of these 
(Casal 2007). Some philosophers also advocate the use of more than 
one principle of justice; David Miller, for example, argues for a tripartite 
model of the principles of need (which can be interpreted in terms of 
sufficiency), desert and equality (Miller 1999). The capability approach 
is usually in the sufficiency camp (Arneson 2006; Anderson 2010), 
although Nussbaum recognizes the importance of equality, arguing that 
thresholds have to be specified in a way that does justice to the equal 
human dignity of every human being. This, she claims, leads to the 
conclusion that, for some capabilities, a sufficient level coincides with 
equality – for example, in voting rights. We do not want to recapitu-
late the whole debate here, for example, the criticism of Thomas Pogge 
(Pogge 2002; Oosterlaken 2012), but rather just jump in and argue for 
our version of sufficiency, which is not so far away from Nussbaum’s 
although with a few alterations. 
 Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2011) demands that every human is entitled 
to all the central capabilities on her list up to certain thresholds, under 
which truly human functioning is no longer possible. Hence, the goal of 
justice, though not of the minimum justice Nussbaum has in mind, is 
not for everyone to have the same or the highest level of capabilities but 
for everyone to be secure in having enough for a decent living. Justice 
also forbids trade-offs between basic human capabilities; if a person falls 
below a threshold in one capability, it is not enough to compensate her 
by allowing a higher level in another dimension. Each capability on the 
list is of equal value, and a shortfall in one of them is enough to consti-
tute an injustice. She also acknowledges, as we ourselves do, that the 
determination of the thresholds for her capabilities is not a purely philo-
sophical task but involves empirical knowledge from other disciplines as 
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well as public deliberation. The ten capabilities on her list should guide 
policies in each country, but it is the responsibility of each country to 
set an adequate threshold. Unfortunately, Nussbaum is rather vague and 
only arbitrarily discusses certain capabilities and their possible thresh-
olds. In her view, for some capabilities, the threshold should be set in 
a way that leads to equality so that each human is basically entitled to 
the same level in that capability (e.g., liberal rights), while for other 
capabilities the threshold can be set lower and hence allows a certain 
degree of inequality (e.g., in housing and material living conditions). 
To her, granting each human each capability above this threshold level 
is a partial and minimal requirement of what justice demands, admit-
ting that there are various ways a just society can deal with inequalities 
above the threshold. However, they have to be arranged in a way so 
that  equal respect and concern are guaranteed for all citizens. According to 
Nussbaum, this implies that each and every capability must be secured 
up to a certain level and that they should never be assessed from a 
trade-off perspective:
 [ ... ]  all ten of these plural and diverse ends are minimum requirements of 
justice , at least up to the threshold level. In other words, the theory 
does  not countenance intuitionistic balancing or trade-offs among 
them. The constitutional structure (once they are put into a constitu-
tion or some other similar set of basic understandings) demands that 
they  all be secured to each and every citizen, up to some appropriate 
threshold level. In desperate circumstances, it may not be possible 
for a nation to secure them all up to the threshold level, but then it 
becomes a purely practical question what to do next, not a question 
of justice. (Nussbaum 2006, 175) 
 How can we, how should we interpret Nussbaum´s rule of sufficiency in 
regard to children in rich countries? She does not give a clear answer; it 
often seems as if she views the capability approach as mainly concerned 
with poverty in poor countries and the severe harm there. We wish to 
specify some important aspects. 
 In rich countries, a higher level of well-being and well-becoming is (1) 
obviously achieved for many children; the possibilities to realize a 
good life are much better than in most other countries in this world. 
Still, certainly not all children achieve the same level of well-being 
and well-becoming, and some even fall short of what justice demands 
in terms of minimal thresholds in these countries. Furthermore, we 
54 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
agree with Nussbaum that it is important to focus on a particular 
problem in a particular context in order to be more specific about 
where thresholds should be set. For our approach in this book, this 
means that it is reasonable to first investigate the situation in rich 
countries in some detail before we extent our theory to global justice 
in the last chapter. The fact that rich countries have already reached 
high levels in many aspects and that welfare states do a partly good 
job to alleviate poverty and to secure a certain level of well-being 
and well-becoming for all children implies that we need to work 
with a different kind of threshold and minimal conditions of justice. 
Still, it is important to also have an absolute minimum in mind, 
since in rich countries, too, there are some cases in which we can 
find severe poverty and other forms of hardship like homelessness, 
exploitation, child trafficking, child hunger and prostitution. In 
general, however, we are concerned with ‘relative’ poverty, as we 
will discuss in the next chapter. The adequate thresholds under such 
circumstances can be set according to two principles: on the one 
hand, we have to ask what is possible in these states and what can 
they provide for children without violating other claims of justice. 
This speaks against too high standards for assessing justice for chil-
dren, because we can never provide all children with a maximum 
in well-being and well-becoming for at least two reasons (Arneson 
and Shapiro 1996; Archard 2004, 62–63; Mills 2003): First, it is too 
demanding for those responsible for the upbringing of children. 
As important as it is to concentrate on children and to recognize 
them as equal sources of moral concern, we should not forget that 
we live in societies where everyone matters from a moral point of 
view. Maximizing the well-being and well-becoming of children 
in a strict sense would certainly lead to a disadvantage for other 
members of society and put unreasonably high burdens on them. 
Justice certainly does not imply the self-abandonment of all adult 
members in order to maximize the well-being and the life chances 
of children. Second, it is very difficult to understand what it even 
means to maximize the well-being and well-becoming of children. 
When it comes to well-being, it just seems unfeasible to say exactly 
what a perfectly good childhood looks like. There are just too many 
opinions about this, both in science and in commonsensical views, 
and any full definition will be ideologically charged. Regarding the 
well-becoming aspect, things are at least as difficult. Growing up is 
always connected to trade-offs, and some options to well-becoming 
can be held open only at the expense of denying others. Since there 
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are definitely many valuable but noncommensurable options as 
to how to live one’s life as an adult, maximizing well-becoming is 
probably not even a coherent idea. We see, therefore, that questions 
concerning the well-being and well-becoming of children are deeply 
entangled with general considerations about the good life. And 
since we agree with the diagnosis of political liberalism that there 
is no objective way to fully determine the nature of the good life 
(Nussbaum 2001; Rawls 2005), we also reject the mentioned ideas 
about maximization. On the other hand, we are always concerned 
with context-sensitive thresholds that are specified according to the 
living standards in that society. This reflects partly what is possible 
in a state but targets a different issue; namely, that it is important 
for justice for children that children do not fall behind for arbitrary 
reasons and that determining the adequate threshold by looking at 
the level that typically is achieved in that society is essential. For 
example, if most children in a society are able to acquire a certain 
level of knowledge and if that knowledge is used for further educa-
tion or in the job market, it is reasonable and feasible to demand 
that all children be brought up to that level. This does not imply 
that each and every child should become a scientist but that each 
and every child should finish primary and secondary school and 
that all children that do so should be on more or less the same 
level. Finally, justice for children in modern welfare states always 
has a forward-looking perspective. As technology and livings stand-
ards grow and as we gain more knowledge on children’s lives and 
health, we naturally can provide for them better; as a consequence, 
demands of justice also improve. In a historical perspective, this is 
quite obvious: the standards of justice for children 150 years ago 
were different; we did not know about many illnesses or about how 
they were transmitted and cured and we were still at the beginning 
of building public infrastructure like railroads, electricity and clean 
water in all places. Hence it was simply not possible to have all chil-
dren grow up and live under the conditions we can easily secure 
for them nowadays and are seen as ‘normal’ today. Of course, the 
requirements for participating as an equal in the society one is part 
of have changed considerably, too. The knowledge and education 
needed for practicing full citizenship in a modern society today is 
different from what was necessary fifty or sixty years ago. And since 
this feature of political participation is usually given much weight 
by capability theorists (Anderson 2010; Nussbaum 2006; Sen 2009), 
the relevant thresholds have to be adapted accordingly. Another 
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example would be life expectancy, something important and a good 
indicator for social inequality. Today life expectancy in all rich coun-
tries is much higher than it was a few decades ago; while we do not 
know whether it will further increase or not, it is clear now that, 
should it increase, it must do so for all and not just for a few – this 
will thus translate into claims of justice. If we know, for instance, 
that a new vaccination can increase the likelihood of getting older 
because it prevents several forms of cancer, then all children have 
a claim to get that vaccination (given that the medical knowledge 
is clear and that it really helps all without great risk of severe side 
effects). Justice for children is hence also a progressive concept. 
 This leads us to the second point. The threshold levels demanded (2) 
by justice in rich countries must always be specified by considering 
both the well-being and the well-becoming of children, which 
we would like to grasp via the concept of  equality of opportunity to 
well-being in adulthood. Justice for children, as we stated before, is 
concerned not only with what actual functionings and capabilities 
a child has but also with what functionings and capabilities she can 
have as an adult and over her life course. That is why injustices 
during childhood are particularly severe; they influence a person’s 
well-becoming negatively and violate the claim of these children to 
sufficient options for future well-being. We have not discussed what 
the well-being as an adult encompasses, but it would be possible to 
come up with a preliminary list using the same, although adapted, 
criteria we presented and assigning the idea of practical reason or 
autonomy a more important role; such a list would perhaps look 
the same as Nussbaum’s or Robeyns’s. In any case, some important 
functionings and capabilities we have showed to matter for both 
children and adults will be on that list, such as health, education 
and social relations. The state should have a strong interest to give 
each child the same chance to achieve functionings and capabilities 
that matter as an adult, which necessarily implies giving many func-
tionings to children. If we want to secure health in adulthood, for 
example, we need to be concerned with health during childhood, 
and it is unjust that adults are impaired in their health because they 
suffered from health issues otherwise preventable or curable during 
childhood. Likewise, the state has a responsibility to provide each 
and every child with the education needed to achieve well-being 
as an adult. Without specifying in detail which capabilities and 
functionings are necessary for a concept of adult well-being, being 
able to find a decent job, to make reasonable political decisions and 
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to have a certain degree of health, literacy and knowledge of one’s 
own body are certainly among them. Harry Adams’s take on justice 
for children, for example, is oriented toward what children need in 
order to develop into autonomous adults (Adams 2008). We agree 
with most of his conclusions, particularly in regard to the import-
ance of early childhood, but a sole focus on autonomy seems too 
narrow. Autonomy, as the capability approach is well aware of, is an 
important aspect of the well-being of adults, but it is not the only 
thing that matters, and justice for children must be concerned with 
many other aspects, as well. 
 Our third point relates to Nussbaum’s claim that equal respect has (3) 
to be shown for each and every member of society – a category that 
obviously includes children. But whereas respecting an adult is to 
a large extent tantamount to respecting her choices and life plans, 
the situation for children is different. We suggest that showing 
equal respect and concern for children should mean that a society 
is equally concerned with every child’s well-being and well-be-
coming. This does not mean supplying every child with the same 
set of resources but rather supporting them with the (material and 
immaterial) means required for achieving the necessary thresholds, 
a commitment lying at the heart of the capability approach: 
 In defining the meaning of equal rights for different groups, a 
capability approach also insists that we start with an understanding 
of how groups and individuals differ in their requirements, given 
both physical and cognitive differences and also differences of social 
starting point. Indeed, it is precisely on account of the importance 
of context in determining what people are able to do and be that the 
capability approach has been defended as superior to resource-based 
approaches: two people may be given the same amount of some 
all-purpose resource such as wealth or income but differ in their real 
capabilities, whether because they have different physical needs or 
because they start from different social positions. Children, in many 
cases, will also be clearly different from adults in the support they 
require from the state in order to develop and enjoy their capabil-
ities. (Dixon and Nussbaum 2012, 561; footnotes omitted) 
 We would also like to employ the distinction between demand-
side and supply-side sufficiency here as proposed by David Kelleher 
(Kelleher 2013): So far sufficiency was presented in a way that exclu-
sively looked at those whose functionings and capabilities lie below 
a certain threshold, and it was claimed that, as a consequence, they 
are entitled to treatment that raises them above the crucial level. 
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Such an account might suitably be called demand-side sufficiency 
view. One could also defend, however, a more differentiated ‘ supply-
side view’ of sufficiency, which consists of two levels: First, bearers 
of justice-based entitlements must give reasonable consideration 
for those who suffer from capability failures (interpreted in terms 
of not reaching certain thresholds); second, they must take actions 
balancing the moral reasons to help and the ‘other claims on the 
person’s possible actions (involving other rights and freedoms, but 
also altogether different concerns that a person may, inter alia, sens-
ibly have)’ (Sen 2004a, 339–340). In other word, they must give 
 sufficient attention to inequalities in the distribution of capabilities, 
and they have the duty of justice to intervene, taking into account 
their own circumstances and the other entitlements and obligations 
they have. This supply-side perspective is especially helpful for two 
reasons: it opens up possibilities of how extreme cases should be 
addressed from a capability perspective, and it explicitly introduces 
the issue of responsibilities, which has been rather neglected in 
the capability approach so far. Still, we would like to stress that a 
supply-side view has its dangers, and one must be careful to avoid 
misusing or instrumentalizing it in order to find excuses why the 
advantaged members of society do not have an immediate respon-
sibility to act against poverty and inequality. In particular, it is 
important to note that the urgency to act attributed to the supply 
side is intertwined with the needs of the demand side. The stronger 
the suffering and injustices among the side of the disadvantaged, 
the stronger are the reasons for the supply side to neglect personal 
interests and to make sacrifices and efforts toward an improvement 
of the general situation. In this sense, the demand-side perspective 
remains an essential part of a capability approach to justice, even 
if there are clear and almost logically given limitations to it. On 
the one hand, it focuses on the victims of injustice and prioritizes 
their claims. This gives them the weight they deserve because, in 
the end, they are what matters. A supply-side view must be aware of 
the danger it poses; namely, being used by those better-off to avoid 
their responsibilities. In a public deliberation about how much is 
enough, victims of injustices are most likely in a weaker position to 
argue for the demand-side view, from which they will profit most 
in comparison with those in a more favorable position, who argue 
for the supply-side view. On the other hand and more importantly, 
how much those who are better-off can be reasonably demanded 
to give, that is the determination of the extent of the supply-side 
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responsibilities, cannot be separated from the demand side, but is 
rather to be conceived as the just answer to it. Only the demand-
side view can provide the necessary information for the supply-side 
view, and not the other way around. If a child is severely deprived, 
then the justified demands are higher than if that child needs fewer 
resources to reach the just minimum in capabilities and function-
ings. On the basis of this demand-side information, the supply side 
view can be brought in. This means that the state and other agents 
of justice are responsible for putting efforts into each child according 
to what she needs in order to achieve functionings and capabilities 
important for well-being and well-becoming. The state has to show 
equal concern for all children’s needs and the particular conversion 
factors they require, whether it be providing public transportation 
to schools in rural areas, securing accessibility to education for chil-
dren with disabilities, or giving ill children the necessary treatment 
and allowing their parents to care for them, for example, via a paid 
leave from work. 
 The issue of setting an adequate threshold must also be discussed. It (4) 
is important to see that the distinction between selecting function-
ings and capabilities and setting thresholds for them is not always so 
clear and that it is best to conceptualize the latter as a form of specifi-
cation of functionings and capabilities. Setting a threshold is the task 
to replace one general description of a functioning or capability by a 
more specified one but also in terms of functionings and capabilities. 
For example, the threshold for being politically included and being 
able to participate can be specified in terms of being allowed to vote 
and to be voted into office. This threshold is nothing more than 
a specification that also uses the terminology and the underlying 
concept of functionings and capabilities. All thresholds discussed by 
capability theorists are, in fact, such specifications; in some empir-
ical research, this also means the translation of a functioning or 
capability into a functioning of having certain goods. In such cases, 
the capability approach in practice gets very close to resourcist 
approaches, since it uses resources or rather the functioning to have 
certain resources as thresholds and specifications. It is more accurate 
to think of setting a threshold that can be specified using different 
functionings and capabilities. The threshold for being educated can 
then, for example, be going to school for a certain number of years, 
learning certain skills and knowledge determined by experts, being 
allowed to pursue further education on the basis of educational 
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achievements, for instance, and being allowed to pursue certain 
occupations based on that education. All these different function-
ings and capabilities can be used together to specify what the general 
functioning and capability of education encompasses and thus 
which level children should reach. Such specifications are necessary 
to put justice to work in policies. To state that each and every child is 
entitled to be educated is a phrase that might read well in a constitu-
tion, but it is not possible to evaluate the success of a certain policy 
or to criticize a state for failing its children on the basis of such a 
general statement. One has to know what it means to be educated 
and what the thresholds are. Here again, it is clear why the concepts 
of well-being and well-becoming are more suited for the task than 
the concept of dignity – a failure to educate all or some the children 
in a state can violate their well-being and in particular their well-
becoming without being a violation of their dignity. 
 What becomes clear when setting a threshold in this way is that 
another distinction gets blurry; namely, that between function-
ings and capabilities, on the one hand, and the conversion factors 
needed to achieve them, on the other hand. In the case of educa-
tion, for example, it is very plausible to assume that compulsory 
schooling for a certain number of years is a conversion factor for 
being educated and not the functioning itself. Nussbaum seems to 
understand it in such a way herself, as she writes that it is up to 
debate whether compulsory education should last for twelve years, 
claiming that under the given circumstances, nine years of schooling 
is not enough. In our view, this reflects pragmatic issues and the fact 
that many conversion factors have some value in themselves and 
are not to be used only instrumentally. To finish school is important 
because it implies that the children have gained certain knowledge 
and skills and because the official degree itself is of value in the labor 
market or in the pursuit of higher education. For pragmatic reasons, 
it is sometimes easier to determine conversion factors, which, again, 
are often resources. In regard to health, for instance, most empirical 
research uses thresholds like a child receiving certain vaccinations, 
which is surely not a specification of health itself but a means to 
achieve and sustain health. It is simply easier to measure than health 
itself, and it is also easier to design a policy based on the claim that 
each and every child should get certain vaccinations. 
 One more thing is extremely important: If setting a threshold always 
implies specifying a general functioning or capability into a set of more 
Social Justice for Children – A Capability Approach 61
concrete functionings and capabilities, then this also implies at least 
three more important insights. First, not each and every child will be 
able to reach these thresholds. If we take education as an example, it is 
likely that we can grant each and every child certain years of schooling 
and that we can help them to acquire some knowledge and skills as well, 
but we can never make sure that all children reach the same level in all 
skills and knowledge. This does not mean, however, that the threshold 
has to be a different one for children with or without disabilities, for 
example. If the threshold embraces that each and every child should 
acquire a certain level in reading, writing and mathematics, including 
a certain set of knowledge about a range of topics, then this threshold 
will not be reached by many children with cognitive disabilities. This 
does not imply that we should lower the threshold for children with 
disabilities, but it rather signals that justice is limited with respect to 
tragic differences between humans we cannot alter – an argument that 
Nussbaum has developed in more detail (Nussbaum 2006). Second, it 
is evident that thresholds have to be sensitive to subjects and, to some 
extent, to the contexts they are applied to, as well. We have just denied 
that thresholds should be different for children with severe disabil-
ities and for those without, but it is still important to have different 
thresholds for different age groups based on the general level of compe-
tence and skills. Hence, the thresholds should allow us to monitor the 
development of the child adequately. Consider health: Pediatrics need 
to define what can be considered a normal development and what are 
distortions that need to be treated, a major health issue for young chil-
dren (Gardner 2015). If there is one general threshold for all children, 
such development issues cannot be detected because it is unclear which 
level of development should be reached at the age of two and which at 
the age of eight. The health threshold must be, on the contrary, set and 
specified in a way that is sensitive to what level a child should reach at 
what age (with certain room for individuality for sure). Otherwise, the 
threshold cannot be used in any meaningful way in the design of health 
policies. Such issues of setting adequate thresholds are certainly a task 
for which philosophers without an extra expertise are not suited; what 
we can do is emphasize that such tasks are essential and, at the same 
time, intertwined with normative and political issues. A third insight is 
that the capability approach suggests a step-by-step procedure for social 
justice assessments: in a first step, general functionings and capabilities 
have to be selected, and in the next step, they have to be specified, 
choosing adequate thresholds that then allow the implementation and 
evaluation of concrete policies. It is possible to evaluate certain living 
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conditions of children as unjust solely on the basis of this second step, 
since the standard of evaluation and the respective benchmark would be 
otherwise too blurry. This also gives a first methodological answer to the 
question that Nussbaum leaves open; namely, how to choose thresholds 
in particular contexts. 
 We also want to combine the sufficiency rule with a priority view in (5) 
regard to children in general and, in particular, in relation to child 
poverty. In a joint article with Rosalind Dixon, Martha Nussbaum 
discusses two reasons for such a priority view in respect to all chil-
dren (Dixon and Nussbaum 2012): cost-efficacy and vulnerability. 
By vulnerability they refer to the dependency of children on adults, 
and by cost-efficacy they mean that investing in children saves huge 
costs the state would have to invest in adults; for example, a vaccin-
ation that costs only a few cents can prevent the development of a 
disease that demands hundreds of thousands of dollars to be treated. 
The vulnerability of children, which we already discussed in length, 
implies that the state has the responsibility to step in if parents or 
other caregivers cannot provide for children because they cannot 
do it for themselves. Cost efficacy, Nussbaum argues, is also relevant 
in regard to fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages. The 
capability approach demands that each and every human is entitled 
to develop and realize certain important functionings (in the case 
of young children) and capabilities (in the case of adolescents and 
adults) and to invest in a fertile functioning that helps to do what 
can save huge costs later on. The same is true for corrosive disad-
vantages, which undermine the development and achievement of 
these important functionings and capabilities. Nussbaum and Dixon 
cite nutrition, children’s health and education as examples of such 
an investment in fertile functionings (or to avoid corrosive disad-
vantages), which should be prioritized by the state. That provides 
a good reason to tackle child poverty with a high priority. We want 
to move from the idea of a priority view toward children in general 
to the idea of prioritizing certain functionings and capabilities on 
the same grounds, or, to put it differently, of prioritizing the allevi-
ation of particular injustices. Such a prioritizing has three elements: 
it asks how important a certain functioning or capability is; how 
severe and widespread its deprivation is; and how it can be over-
come and what means are needed to secure justice in relation to that 
dimension. As we will show over the course of the next chapters, 
child poverty fulfills these three criteria (it affects functionings and 
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capabilities with a high priority, is widespread and can be overcome 
without unfeasible efforts) and hence should be tackled with a very 
high priority. This view is compatible with the idea of a moderate-
sufficiency view that was developed by Richard Arneson (Arneson 
2006). This view implies (a) prioritizing the gains in well-being of 
those who are below the threshold, (b) that those who are further 
below the threshold are to be prioritized and (c) that losses or gains 
in well-being above the threshold are important but that losses or 
gains below the threshold are to be prioritized. For children living in 
poverty, this has four implications worth stressing: First, children in 
poverty should be prioritized over children not in poverty, and the 
state or other agents of justice should provide them with the conver-
sion factors they need, giving them priority over those that children 
need to achieve well-being higher than the threshold. For example, 
if the state can either make some elite universities better or remake 
the education system so as to enable poor, disadvantaged children to 
reach a level of educational sufficiency (in welfare states this could 
mean producing more or less equally educated children after the 
designated years of compulsory schooling), the state should priori-
tize the latter. Second, the moderate sufficiency view also implies 
that children are to be prioritized over adults due to the long-lasting 
consequences of injustices suffered during childhood. For this argu-
ment it is necessary to include a temporal dimension in the concept 
of well-being. The gains in well-being for children will be higher than 
the gains of older adults because the children will live longer. Also 
the losses below the threshold are more likely to be higher if chil-
dren are not prioritized. As we will argue in the next chapter in more 
detail, poverty during childhood is very likely to heavily affect the 
whole life course in a negative way; if sufficiency is concerned with 
securing a certain level of well-being, not at a single point in time but 
over the life course, then it has to give priority to dealing with injus-
tices that have longer-lasting effects on well-being. A third conclu-
sion based on the priority view is important for global justice, but we 
want to mention it here also: severe child poverty in poorer coun-
tries should be tackled with a higher priority than less severe child 
poverty in welfare states, but not primarily at the expense of the chil-
dren in poverty in welfare states but – if any expense is necessary at 
all – at the expense of adults who have a high well-being above the 
threshold. This follows from the rule to prioritize more severe child 
poverty over less severe and to prioritize children before adults. 
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 These five points illustrate what justice for children in rich countries 
demands. We will not be able to set a specific threshold for all the 
important functionings and capabilities that matter for the well-being 
and well-becoming of children, but the thin concept employed by us 
revolves around giving all children equal opportunity to later well-being 
and making sure that they reach the highest level of well-being possible 
given the state’s level of development. In modern welfare states, we have 
seen unprecedented progress over the last 150 years, partly with severely 
damaging side effects (climate change and resource exploitation) and at 
the cost of other countries. These issues should not be downplayed, and 
global justice should indeed be concerned with them and what conse-
quences they should have for the design of justice in rich countries. It is 
perhaps necessary to adjust some dimensions of well-being, fundamen-
tally rethinking the current consumerist orientation that requires ever 
more products at a cheaper price. In general, we assume that the func-
tionings and capabilities we presented as important will hold even if the 
thresholds within them, hence the specified functionings and capabil-
ities into which we translate them in a specific context, should vary; 
we certainly allow for the possibility that due to the demands of global 
justice, thresholds will have to decrease in rich countries in order to 
increase around the globe. Unfortunately, dealing with real-life justice 
and problems encountered along the way is sometimes messy and blurry 
(this is an accusation Nussbaum has often had to face). For our case, the 
case of child poverty in modern welfare states, we argue that we cannot 
come up with a definite list or definite thresholds for the items on that 
list, but this is not needed in order to fulfill an important philosophical 
duty; namely, to criticize this injustice. We will discuss this final point 
before moving on to examine child poverty and its effects on the well-
being and well-becoming of children. 
 1.4 Conclusions 
 How can we criticize any injustice based on the concept of justice we 
have outlined so far? We have a preliminary list of functionings and 
capabilities and an underdetermined distributional rule for specifying 
the thresholds children are entitled to a as a matter of justice. This rule 
is underdetermined because the setting of thresholds of functionings 
and capabilities demands not only a high amount of interdisciplinary 
knowledge and expertise but the in-depth examination of particular 
issues and contexts; both aspects are highly complex, and we will not 
be able to sufficiently deal with them in this book. One could assume 
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that, with these tools, we are not very well equipped to examine child 
poverty and to criticize it as unjust, an objection we would like to 
counter on four grounds, which get support from other applications of 
the capability approach for different purposes, for example, the one by 
Robeyns mentioned above (Robeyns 2003): Firstly, in order to criticize 
an injustice, we do not need a fully comprehensive concept of justice 
with a definite list and fully specified thresholds. Knowing that some 
functionings and capabilities are of high value for children is enough to 
judge it as unjust if they fall short of them for arbitrary and changeable 
reasons. Hence, a critique of child poverty can already start and be of 
value if it can be shown that child poverty interferes with the entitle-
ments of the affected children to even just one important functioning 
or capability. Furthermore, it is enough to argue that children fall short 
either in one or more functionings or capabilities that matter for their 
well-being as children or in those that matter for their well-becoming 
and well-being as adults. Child poverty or any other injustice is unjust 
as soon as it interferes with either well-being or well-becoming, and it 
does not have to affect both, although the case is stronger if it does. In 
fact, we will argue that child poverty is a corrosive disadvantage because 
it usually deprives children not only of important elements of their well-
being but also of their well-becoming. 
 Secondly, thresholds can already be applied for criticizing child 
poverty if they are only partially specified. We have argued that setting 
a threshold in a dimension means to determine functionings or capabil-
ities on a less general level. How concrete this description must be 
depends, as Robeyns argued, on the task at hand. For our purposes, we 
do not think that it is useful to examine, for example, a particular part of 
the education system in a particular country, say the primary school in 
the United Kingdom. We are more concerned with the injustice of child 
poverty on a more general level that spans across all modern welfare 
states and abstracts from the many differences that clearly exist between 
these countries. For that general level, we do not need to specify the 
functionings and capabilities we will use on a highly detailed level, 
acknowledging that they cannot cover all important aspects. As we 
will show in the next chapter, these thresholds already serve to detect 
important violations of justice. 
 Finally, the specification of a threshold is relative to what is possible 
in a given country. In the next chapter, we will use a negative approach 
and concern ourselves with how child poverty affects the well-being 
and well-becoming of children in regard to important functionings and 
capabilities, using as a benchmark how they fare in comparison with 
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other nonpoor children in that country. It is possible, although not 
plausible, that we miss an important aspect of injustice by this approach, 
because it could be the case that all children, poor and nonpoor, are 
below the threshold of what is possible and hence live in injustice. In 
order to determine that, we would need a different approach than the 
one we use and to pursue another inquiry. For our goal of criticizing 
child poverty, we are content with showing that it fulfills the criteria 
of not bringing these children up to the threshold that is possible in 
that state, and that level is well displayed by the fact that the majority 
of children reach it. It is hence for arbitrary reasons, namely for being 
poor, that some children do not reach that threshold in some important 
functionings and capabilities, which qualifies as unjust. The goal of the 
next chapter will be to build that case based on a close examination 
of empirical knowledge regarding three functionings: health, education 
and social inclusion. This empirical work does not show us that these 
three are so important that each and every child is entitled to reach a 
sufficient level of them; this work was done in this chapter. We will 
simply show that under the assumption that these three, health, educa-
tion and social inclusion, are relevant for justice, empirical research 
indicates that child poverty is unjust – both in relation to the well-being 
and the well-becoming of children. 
 The fourth ground is that we are concerned with a group-based 
injustice when we criticize child poverty. We will make clear in the next 
chapter that we are not claiming that each and every child in poverty 
suffers from the deprivations we examine. Rather, we are concerned with 
these children as a particular social group in which many individuals 
are suffering from deprivations that can be traced back to their shared 
feature, namely being poor, which they cannot be held responsible for 
and cannot change themselves. Robeyns has criticized gender inequal-
ities in many functionings because they cannot be plausibly attributed 
to different preferences (Robeyns 2003). For children this is even more 
obvious: poor children seldom wish to be in ill health or less educated, 
and more strikingly, it is certain that they lack a capacity to realize a 
preference for good health or education unless other persons and insti-
tutions provide them with care and other conversion factors. 
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